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CORPORATE LAW FOR GOOD PEOPLE 
Yuval Feldman, Adi Libson & Gideon Parchomovsky 
ABSTRACT—This Article offers a novel analysis of the field of corporate 
governance by viewing it through the lens of behavioral ethics. It calls for 
both shifting the focus of corporate governance to a new set of loci of 
potential corporate wrongdoing and adding new tools to the corporate 
governance arsenal. Behavioral ethics scholarship emphasizes that the large 
share of wrongdoing is generated by “good people” whose intention is to act 
ethically. Their wrongdoing stems from “bounded ethicality”—various 
cognitive and motivational limitations in their ethical decision-making 
processes—that leads to biased decisions that seem legitimate. Bounded 
ethicality has important implications for a wide range of topics in corporate 
governance, like board structure, independent directors, regulation of 
institutional investors and proxy advisory firms, the business judgment rule, 
corporate liability, and intraboard fiduciary duties. In the legal domain, 
corporate law provides the most fertile ground for the application of 
behavioral ethics. It encapsulates many of the features that the behavioral 
ethics literature finds to confound the ethical judgment of good people, like 
principal–agent relations, group decisions, victim remoteness, vague 
directives, and subtle conflicts of interest. 
Behavioral ethics suggests a view of corporate law that is dramatically 
different than that portrayed by traditional legal and economic theorists. Not 
only does it suggest that wrongdoing can be committed by well-intentioned 
people who wish to do right, but also that the biases they display call for a 
radically different set of legal interventions than those advocated by standard 
economic theory. If standard theory views corporate agents as self-interest-
maximizers, bounded ethicality perceives them as actors with varied and 
nuanced ethical motivations that could benefit from subtle legal reforms. 
This Article’s assessment of corporate governance through the 
behavioral ethical lens proceeds in three stages. First, it exposes potential 
wrongdoing by good people that conventional corporate governance does not 
address. Second, it suggests novel corporate governance interventions 
supported by behavioral ethics to address wrongdoing by good people. 
Finally, it identifies existing interventions that, according to behavioral 
ethics analysis, may have unintended adverse effects on the behavior of well-
meaning corporate officers and exacerbate wrongdoing instead of mitigating 
it. 
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“Half of the harm that is done in this world / Is due to people who want to feel 
important. / They don’t mean to do harm—but the harm does not interest them. 
/ Or they do not see it, or they justify it / Because they are absorbed in the 
endless struggle / To think well of themselves.” 
—T.S. Eliot† 
INTRODUCTION 
In February 2018, Janet Yellen took an unprecedented step and 
prohibited Wells Fargo from expanding until “robust and comprehensive 
 
 † THE COCKTAIL PARTY 111 (1950). 
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reforms [are] in place to make certain that the abuses do not occur again.”1 
Even though the measures were unprecedented, they were not surprising, 
given the scope of the long-lasting corporate misconduct in the Wells Fargo 
case spanning over seven distinctive operations. In September 2016, various 
federal and state regulators announced that Wells Fargo had committed “a 
major breach of trust” in creating unauthorized accounts, and that a 
settlement including a $100 million fine had been reached between the bank 
and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.2 Following the unauthorized 
accounts scandal, the Department of Justice (DOJ) claimed that the bank also 
illegally repossessed 413 of its customers’ cars. 3  In November 2016, a 
related Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation charged 
that the number of fake accounts could reach two million.4 In December 
2016, the Department of Labor opened a separate investigation regarding 
Wells Fargo’s violations of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act by signing reports that 
did not fully disclose information regarding these unauthorized accounts. 
These investigations of Wells Fargo’s legal violations have been followed 
by a series of additional investigations and allegations.5 
 
 1 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Responding to Widespread Consumer 
Abuses and Compliance Breakdowns by Wells Fargo, Federal Reserve Restricts Wells’ Growth Until 
Firm Improves Governance and Controls. Concurrent with Fed Action, Wells to Replace Three Directors 
by April, One by Year End (Feb. 2, 2018, 6:15 PM), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
pressreleases/enforcement20180202a.htm [https://perma.cc/DJQ3-8RJC]. 
 2 James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo to Pay $185 Million Settlement for ‘Outrageous’ Sales Culture, 
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016, 3:10 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-settlement-
20160907-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/RN9G-2HCY]. 
 3 Jackie Wattles, U.S.: Wells Fargo Illegally Repossessed 413 Service Members’ Cars, CNN MONEY 
(Sept. 30, 2016, 2:13 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/29/news/wells-fargo-servicemembers-cars/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/XUM6-N4J9]. 
 4 Matt Egan, Wells Fargo’s Legal Mess Just Got Worse, CNN MONEY (Nov. 3, 2016, 12:02 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2016/11/03/investing/wells-fargo-fake-account-sec-investigation/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/A3YX-KPSP]. Later on, Wells Fargo increased the estimate of fake accounts to 3.5 
million. See Uri Berliner, Wells Fargo Admits to Nearly Twice as Many Possible Fake Accounts—3.5 
Million, NPR (Aug. 31, 2017, 1:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/31/ 
547550804/wells-fargo-admits-to-nearly-twice-as-many-possible-fake-accounts-3-5-million [https:// 
perma.cc/VDA4-FCCD]. 
 5 Wells Fargo acknowledged that an accusation by the Department of Labor that it had retaliated 
illegally against whistleblowers might be true. Matt Egan, Wells Fargo’s Whistleblower Problem 
Worsens, CNN MONEY (Apr. 6, 2017, 11:45 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/04/06/investing/wells-
fargo-whistleblower-retaliation-osha/index.html [https://perma.cc/2C4Y-9C8Z]. In June 2017, customers 
filed various lawsuits claiming that Wells Fargo modified mortgages without authorization from the 
mortgagors. Gretchen Morgenson, Wells Fargo Is Accused of Making Improper Changes to Mortgages, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/business/wells-fargo-loan-
mortgage.html [https://perma.cc/E5FN-8FBV]. Wells Fargo also admitted in July 2017 that it charged 
customers for car insurance they did not need, which may have caused thousands of customers to default 
on car loans. Matt Egan, Wells Fargo May Have Forced 570,000 Customers into Unneeded Auto 
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Surprisingly, when examining the identities of the people who took 
blame for this massive serial wrongdoing, one does not find villains like 
Bernie Madoff. In the Wells Fargo case, an investigative committee of 
independent directors concluded that the root cause was the bank’s 
decentralized structure and the resulting lack of transparency, failure to 
understand the enormity of the problem, and slow response to remedy the 
issue.6 When the Wells Fargo board decided to claw back over $75 million 
in pay from former-CEO John Stumpf and Carrie Tolstedt, a retired 
executive who headed the community-banking department, they justified it 
on the grounds that the two “did not do enough to address the culture at Wells 
that led employees” to wrongdoing.7 The board report noted that “Stumpf 
was by nature an optimistic executive who refused to believe that the sales 
model was seriously impaired.” 8  The board stopped short of attributing 
malicious intent to them or the four directors that were also ousted as a result 
of the scandal.9 If there was no malicious intent by the top executives and 
board, what caused such pervasive wrongdoing by so many of the employees 
of Wells Fargo, which resulted in 5,300 employees being fired?10 The Wells 
Fargo story teaches an important lesson: in the corporate world, legal wrongs 
are often committed by well-meaning executives who wish to do good; they 
do not consciously act to promote their narrow self-interest at the expense of 
the shareholders. Yet, they fail to do good, owing to what has been termed 
in the literature “bounded ethicality,” which includes the various cognitive 
 
Insurance, CNN MONEY (July 28, 2017, 1:22 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/07/28/investing/ 
wells-fargo-auto-insurance-car-loans/index.html) [https://perma.cc/78LU-XD95]. An additional lawsuit 
filed in August 2017 “accuse[d] Wells Fargo of overcharging small businesses for credit card 
transactions.” Jackie Wattles, Ben Geier & Matt Egan, Wells Fargo’s 17-Month Nightmare, CNN MONEY 
(Feb. 5, 2018, 7:28 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/05/news/companies/wells-fargo-timeline 
[https://perma.cc/QC25-7QGQ]. In October 2017, Wells Fargo admitted separately that 110,000 
mortgage holders were erroneously fined for missing a deadline. Id. In June, the SEC imposed a fine of 
$4 million on Wells Fargo for improperly pushing “mom-and-pop” brokerage customers to actively trade 
complex investments in order to generate higher fees. Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Accused of Misconduct 
Again, CNN MONEY (June 25, 2018, 5:50 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/25/ 
investing/wells-fargo-advisors-sec-settlement/index.html [https://perma.cc/8GXC-R24S]. 
 6 INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD. OF WELLS FARGO & CO., SALES PRACTICES INVESTIGATION REPORT 
(2017) [hereinafter WELLS BD. REP.], https://www.wellsfargo.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/ 
presentations/2017/board-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QK6-XYTR]. 
 7 Bob Bryan, Wells Fargo Board Slams Former CEO Stumpf for Accounts Scandal, Claws Back 
Another $28 Million, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 10, 2017, 7:24 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/wells-
fargo-john-stumpf-carrie-tolstedt-accounts-scandal-2017-4 [https://perma.cc/D6KR-2QN6]. 
 8 WELLS BD. REP., supra note 6, at 10. 
 9 See Bryan, supra note 7. 
 10  See Benjamin van Rooij & Adam Fine, Toxic Corporate Culture: Assessing Organizational 
Processes of Deviancy, 8 ADMIN. SCIS. 1, 2 (2018). 
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and motivational limitations in an actor’s ethical decision-making 
processes.11 
The Wells Fargo case illustrates the need to rethink how wrongdoing 
emerges and spreads in the corporate context. While the Wells Fargo case 
may be an extreme one, it is part of an increasing number of recent corruption 
cases in the corporate context, a trend that includes Enron, WorldCom, 
Citibank and AIG, Volkswagen, and the Libor manipulation scandal 
involving major global banks. 12  Various reforms, such as the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 200213 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act,14 have attempted to address corporate misconduct. Yet, cases 
like Wells Fargo indicate that these reforms have not addressed some of the 
most fundamental aspects of corporate corruption. Indeed, behavioral ethics 
literature shows that wrongdoing by well-meaning actors is a ubiquitous 
phenomenon.15 
In this Article, we argue that part of the failure to address corporate 
wrongdoing is based on a profound mischaracterization of its roots. The 
burgeoning literature on behavioral ethics shows that wrongdoing in the 
corporate world is not committed exclusively by calculative self-interest-
maximizers who wish to enrich themselves at the expense of the 
 
 11 See Dolly Chugh, Max H. Bazerman & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Bounded Ethicality as a Psychological 
Barrier to Recognizing Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 
IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 74, 75, 90–91 (Don A. Moore, Daylian M. Cain, 
George Loewenstein & Max H. Bazerman eds., 2005) (“We have proposed that perceptual, cognitive, 
and social cognitive processes are bounded in similar, systematic ways that lead to gaps in observation 
and errors in decision making.”). 
 12 The banks that have been fined for taking part in the Libor manipulation include Barclays, the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS, Deutsche Bank, Société Générale, Citigroup, and JP Morgan Chase. See 
James McBride, Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Oct. 12, 2016), https:// 
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/understanding-libor-scandal [https://perma.cc/5RLY-9ULZ]. Regarding the 
connection between these scandals, see From Enron and WorldCom to Wells Fargo and VW Expanded 
Violation Tracker Covers Corporate Crime Cases Back to 2000, CORP. CRIME REP. (Sept. 17, 2017, 6:42 
PM), https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/enron-worldcom-wells-fargo-vw-expanded-
violation-tracker-covers-corporate-crime-cases-back-2000/ [https://perma.cc/UL72-S5MX]. 
 13 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 14 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 15 See, e.g., Rajna Gibson, Carmen Tanner & Alexander F. Wagner, Preferences for Truthfulness: 
Heterogeneity Among and Within Individuals, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 532, 534 (2013) (finding that with 
no incentive to tell the truth, individuals with stronger inherent protected values of truthfulness are more 
resistant to lying when the economic costs of telling the truth are only marginal). Dishonesty studies have 
estimated that approximately 25% of individuals are (using our terminology) situational wrongdoers (e.g., 
sensitive to size of gains), 30% are maximizers who consistently maximize self-interest, 30% are 
consistent “ethical” good-doers, 10% have no recognizable pattern, and 5% lie regardless of the gains. 
See Uri Gneezy, Bettina Rockenbach & Marta Serra-Garcia, Measuring Lying Aversion, 93 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 293, 298–99 (2013). 
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shareholders. Rather, it is also perpetrated by well-meaning and other-
regarding individuals whose ethical mores often lead them astray. 
This Article constitutes the first attempt to apply the insights of 
behavioral ethics to corporate law. Building on behavioral ethics’ findings, 
we unveil an alternative and surprising source of corporate misconduct: 
people who think of themselves as good people and normally strive to act in 
uncorrupt ways.16 Behavioral ethics points out that through a combination of 
deliberate and nondeliberate processes, many people may behave unethically 
with limited awareness of the unethical nature of their behavior. 17 
Incorporating the insights of behavioral ethics into the field of corporate law 
will greatly benefit research and policy analysis in this area. Indeed, from the 
vantage point of behavioral ethicists, the corporate scandals that occurred in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 were a “perfect storm” that 
exposed the shortcomings of the traditional way of thinking about corporate 
law. The domain of corporate law displays many of the situational features 
that can lead “good-doers” astray, such as a conflicting set of duties, group 
decision-making, victim remoteness, vague directives, and subtle conflicts 
of interest. Thus, ignoring the ways in which “good” corporate agents allow 
themselves to behave unethically may cause corporate law to be ineffective. 
This Article points to both structural and procedural applications of 
behavioral ethics to corporate governance. It lists four central structural 
applications, “structural” referring to the institutional design of corporations 
as prescribed by law. First, it explains how group decision-making on 
corporate boards facilitates unethical decisions and other forms of 
misconduct. It then suggests that these effects could be curtailed by 
introducing mechanisms that effectively transform board decisions into 
discrete sets of individual decisions and by assigning individual liability to 
directors for board decisions. 
Second, it puts the spotlight on “softer” types of conflicts of interest 
that may cause greater self-interest-promotion than “stronger” types. In this 
context, it shows that the institution of independent directors that is widely 
viewed as a panacea to hard conflicts of interest may exacerbate soft or subtle 
conflicts of interest. Accordingly, the Article explores the options of limiting 
 
 16 Existing scholarship has taken steps in this direction by pointing to the connection between 
corporate culture and corporate corruption. See, e.g., van Rooij & Fine, supra note 10, at 4 (aiming to 
show how corporations dealing with toxic cultures can be aided by existing social, management, and 
behavioral science literature); Yun Zhang, Bin He & Xu Sun, The Contagion of Unethical Pro-
Organizational Behavior: From Leaders to Followers, 9 FRONTIERS PSYCH. 1, 7 (2018) (discussing a 
different perspective of the notion that organizational norms can cause people to behave less ethically). 
 17  See YUVAL FELDMAN, THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING STATES’ ABILITY TO 
REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR 1, 35 (2018). 
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the role of independent directors or significantly enhancing their 
independence. 
Third, this Article analyzes how vague legal standards intensify 
wrongdoing in the corporate context. To counter this challenge, and in 
keeping with behavioral ethics literature, the Article advocates for the use of 
bright-line rules and catalogs specific lists of proscribed behaviors that 
would provide corporate actors with clear guidance as to how to carry out 
their responsibilities. 
Fourth, this Article addresses the central finding of behavioral ethics 
that transgressions are easier to justify when they benefit other parties and 
examines its implications for corporate law. This insight suggests that 
corporate agents are more likely to engage in wrongdoing when they 
promote the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. This type of 
wrongdoing calls for restricting the ability of managers to promote the 
interests of third-party stakeholders and eliminating “familial” language 
from firms’ ethical codes. 
This Article also underscores two central procedural applications, 
“procedural” referring to how decisions are made or should be made in 
corporate settings as opposed to the content of the decision. Behavioral ethics 
studies suggest that individuals may have a greater tendency to cause 
wrongdoing by omission than by commission.18 This effect is known as the 
“omission bias” and has far-reaching implications for corporate law. It 
suggests that managers, directors, and advisory boards are far more likely to 
breach their duties via inaction or indecision. Hence, this Article will propose 
various interventions, all taken from behavioral ethics scholarship, that 
reframe passive situations as active ones by requiring corporate agents to 
assume an active role even when they elect to preserve the status quo. 
Many of our suggested interventions go in the opposite direction of 
what conventional economic analysis would prescribe. We show that lower 
self-interest may exacerbate the impact of conflicts of interest rather than 
diminish them; vagueness and uncertainty regarding a legal norm may 
exacerbate wrongdoing, not improve it; and the desire to enhance the 
interests of third parties is more likely to lead to wrongdoing than the desire 
to further one’s own self-interest. Our analysis also explains how some 
reforms in corporate governance are not only ineffective, but even 
counterproductive in preventing ethical failures of corporate agents. 
 
 18 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, 246 SCI. AM. 160, 
173 (1982) (hypothesizing that an omission is less regretful than an action, even if the results are 
identical). 
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Structurally, the Article proceeds in two Parts. Part I presents the main 
findings of the innovative field of behavioral ethics. It then applies the 
implications of these findings to corporate law, both in terms of the situations 
that are most problematic for different corporate actors and in terms of the 
inadvertent effects of the regulatory interventions that have been used to 
date. Part II discusses the applications that behavioral ethics may have on 
numerous issues pertaining to corporate governance. Our discussion in this 
Part is divided into two categories: the first focuses on structural applications 
of behavioral ethics to corporate governance, and the second focuses on 
procedural applications. 
We would like to clarify at the outset two important aspects of this 
research. First, the distinction between “good” and “bad” corporate 
executives is not always an easy one. There is no discrete line separating 
good actors from bad ones. Individuals can be calculative and act as self-
interest-maximizers in certain contexts, and still believe that they act in the 
furtherance of others’ interests in other contexts. As we demonstrate, the 
nature of the specific decision they are facing may cause them to adopt 
different mindsets and different modes of operation. Thus, our analysis 
should not be perceived as a facial attack on the traditional way of thinking 
about and regulating corporate law. Rather, it should be deemed a critical 
addendum to the conventional way of thinking about corporate law. 
Second, although the findings on which we base our policy 
recommendations are robust, many of them originate in lab experiments that 
emulate real-world situations, not reality itself. Despite the robustness of the 
studies we cite, and additional studies demonstrating that people behave 
similarly in real life as they behave in experiments,19 we offer our policy 
recommendations with the requisite degree of caution. We believe that the 
insights of behavioral ethics are too important to ignore. Yet, further analysis 
and empirical testing are required prior to the enactment of legal reform on 
their basis. Our goal in this Article is therefore to illuminate a new path for 
future research and to point to possible legal interventions that take account 
 
 19 See, e.g., Alain Cohn, Michel André Maréchal, David Tannenbaum & Christian Lukas Zünd, Civic 
Honesty Around the Globe, 365 SCIENCE 70, 71 (2019) (demonstrating the applicability of behavioral 
ethics in real life through field experiments); Maryam Kouchaki, Francesca Gino & Yuval Feldman, The 
Ethical Perils of Personal, Communal Relations: A Language Perspective, 30 PSYCH. SCI. 1745, 1760–
62 (2019) (revealing a positive correlation between the wording of real-world ethical codes at 
corporations, such as the use of “we” versus “employees,” and the actual rate of corporate illegality as 
reported in the media, such as environmental violations and fraudulent actions); Shaul Shalvi, Financial 
Temptation Increases Civic Honesty, 365 SCIENCE 29, 30 (2019) (emphasizing how real-life data 
reinforce other studies that have demonstrated a correlation between experiments and real-life data). 
115:1125 (2021) Corporate Law for Good People 
1133 
of the complex ethical dilemmas of many real-world directors and corporate 
officers who strive to do good for the constituencies they represent. 
I. WHAT IS BEHAVIORAL ETHICS? 
Behavioral ethics, a growing area within psychology and management 
literature, demonstrates that an individual’s unethical behavior is 
exacerbated through processes that create a gap between her actual behavior 
and her subjective evaluation thereof.20 The central insight of behavioral 
ethics is that in many instances, individuals desire to behave ethically, 
consciously willing themselves to sacrifice their own interest for the sake of 
others. But psychological distortions can lead those same individuals to 
maximize their own self-interest, despite their contrary intent, due to 
“bounded ethicality.” “Bounded ethicality” conceptualizes and describes the 
various cognitive and motivational limitations in ethical decision-making 
processes that lead to biased decisions that nevertheless appear legitimate to 
the actor, and which can cause individuals to downplay the unethical 
consequences of their own behavior.21 One of the central challenges facing 
behavioral ethics is detecting elements that impact ethical salience, that is, 
how easy it is for individuals to notice in a given situation that their action 
might have unethical consequences.22 Behavioral ethics, therefore, suggests 
that a significant amount of wrongdoing and unethical behavior stems from 
ethical individuals who are not fully deliberative in promoting their own 
interests at the expense of others.23 
The driving force behind these findings is individuals’ tendency for 
ethical self-concept maintenance: their need to maintain their ethical view of 
themselves while promoting their materialistic self-interest.24 There are two 
central methods through which this occurs: automatic psychological 
mechanisms and semi-deliberative mechanisms. Automatic psychological 
 
 20 See FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 1–22. 
 21 See Chugh et al., supra note 11, at 75 (describing key aspects of bounded ethicality). 
 22 FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 11. 
 23 For a discussion of people’s different modes of reasoning, see generally Lutz Sommer, The Theory 
of Planned Behaviour and the Impact of Past Behaviour, 10 INT’L BUS. & ECON. RSCH. J. 91 (2011). For 
an excellent comparison of many of the models that attempt to compare nondeliberative behavior with 
the more traditional views of rational decision-making, see James S. Uleman, S. Adil Saribay & Celia M. 
Gonzalez, Spontaneous Inferences, Implicit Impressions, and Implicit Theories, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 
329, 330 (2008), and Sunita Sah & George Loewenstein, Nothing to Declare: Mandatory and Voluntary 
Disclosure Leads Advisors to Avoid Conflicts of Interest, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 575, 576 (2014). 
 24 See Nina Mazar, On Amir & Dan Ariely, The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-
Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MKTG. RSCH. 633, 633–34 (2008); David M. Bersoff, Why Good People 
Sometimes Do Bad Things: Motivated Reasoning and Unethical Behavior, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. BULL. 28, 28–30 (1999). 
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mechanisms are usually employed ex ante and create a situation in which the 
individual is not even aware of her misconduct (e.g., when a director doesn’t 
even notice that her own self-interest shapes her understanding of what is 
good to the corporation). Semi-deliberative mechanisms are used by actors 
in a stage of moral dissonance—when they are aware or partially aware of 
their wrongdoing—to justify suspect decisions (e.g., when a director 
recognizes the conflict of interest but downplays it by saying something like 
“everyone is doing it”). 25  Defining the exact border between the two 
mechanisms is difficult, as will be demonstrated in the coming paragraphs. 
Behavioral ethics mostly applies to decisions made in what is known as 
“System 1,”26 which is the mental mode based primarily on intuitions, in 
contrast to “System 2,” which is slower and more analytical, where reason 
dominates. 27  The distinction between System 1 and System 2 is widely 
discussed in behavioral economics literature. 28  In general, behavioral 
economics scholars suggest that the activation of System 1 can harm the 
individual’s self-interest by not fully calculating the pros and cons for each 
course of action. Behavioral ethics scholars, on the other hand, discuss a 
similar effect that goes in the opposite direction. Behavioral ethics scholars 
demonstrate that System 1 is structured to promote the individual’s self-
interest in ethical contexts, even when the individual would be willing to 
sacrifice her own interest for the sake of others. 29  Yet the activation of 
System 1 causes the actor to eventually behave in a way that promotes her 
own interests at the expense of others. This occurs through one of the two 
aforementioned mechanisms. The automatic psychological mechanism—
System 1—may cause the individual to be completely unaware of the ethical 
problem arising from her behavior. The semi-deliberative mechanism makes 
it harder to distinguish between the relative involvement of System 1 and 
System 2 because they cause the individual to gravitate towards an unethical 
 
 25 See Bersoff, supra note 24, at 28–29; Shaul Shalvi, Jason Dana, Michel J.J. Handgraaf & Carsten 
K.W. De Dreu, Justified Ethicality: Observing Desired Counterfactuals Modifies Ethical Perceptions and 
Behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESS 181, 189 (2011). 
 26 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 19–30 (2011). 
 27 Id. The inability to clearly distinguish between the two is one of the central arguments of those 
who oppose Professor Daniel Kahneman’s concept of two-system reasoning. See, e.g., Arie W. 
Kruglanski & Gerd Gigerenzer, Intuitive and Deliberate Judgments Are Based on Common Principles, 
118 PSYCH. REV. 97, 97–98 (2011) (providing scholarly objections to the two-system reasoning 
framework). 
 28 For Professor Kahneman’s book delineating these two systems, see generally KAHNEMAN, supra 
note 26. For more elaboration on the literature discussing this distinction, see FELDMAN, supra note 17, 
at 2. 
 29 See Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of 
Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RSCH. 189, 190–91 (2004). 
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course of action even when she is aware to some extent of the moral problem 
she is facing. The semi-deliberative mechanism related to justifications may 
make her feel better regarding her own ethicality while performing the 
unethical action.30 
Even though the theoretical framework of behavioral economics and 
behavioral ethics is similar, the two fields disagree over which mechanisms 
increase problematic behavior and how likely interventions such as nudges 
might succeed in the long run. In behavioral economics, nudges—the ability 
to predictably change peoples’ behavior through small alterations in the 
choice architecture of the decision they need to make 31 —have been 
celebrated. However, those nudges will not necessarily succeed in the 
behavioral ethics context. For example, one of the most successful policy 
implications of nudges—increasing employee participation in retirement 
savings plans by changing the default from opt-in to automatic 
enrollment32—prompts people to overcome their cognitive limitations and 
save more towards their retirement. In the behavioral economics context, 
nudges serve a subject’s self-interest, like saving for retirement, so the 
subject will be receptive to them. But a subject may not be receptive to 
ethical nudges if their purpose is to bar the promotion of the subject’s own 
interest, such as limiting tax avoidance through a default payment.33 For this 
reason, most of the solutions suggested in the behavioral ethics literature—
and in particular the ones relevant to corporate governance—do not rely on 
subconscious methods like nudges, but rather on more conscious methods 
and mechanisms that increase awareness to achieve ethical debiasing.34 
We now turn to demonstrate the central behavioral ethics paradigms: 
those associated with automatic mechanisms as well as those based on semi-
deliberative mechanisms. The exploration below is not meant to be 
exhaustive, but rather to illustrate how behavioral ethics mechanisms 
operate.35 
 
 30  Regarding the distinction between automatic and nonautomatic behavioral effects that cause 
unethicality, see FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 1–31. 
 31 Regarding the utilization of nudges to address bounded rationality, see RICHARD H. THALER & 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008). 
 32 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 104–05 (2013). 
 33 See FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 100–01. 
 34 For a discussion regarding ethical debiasing, see id. at 98–99. 
 35 Regarding the description of the vast amount of scholarship in behavioral ethics in comparison to 
the more limited amount of scholarship in the field of behavioral economics, see id. at 7, which explains 
that the vast size of the literature and of dominant scholars in the field is one of the reasons it has less 
influence on legal scholarship: there are more competing paradigms, which prevents the emergence of 
one dominant paradigm. 
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A. “Automatic” Mechanisms 
According to the behavioral ethics’ bounded-ethicality perspective, 
automatic mechanisms cause an individual to become unaware of the ethical 
dimension of a situation she is facing. The distinction between automatic 
mechanisms that cause ethical unawareness and semi-deliberative 
mechanisms that cause an individual to downplay or justify unethical 
behavior is very fine and, in some cases, cannot be demarcated clearly. These 
mechanisms are illustrated in paradigms like moral forgetting, moral fatigue, 
and objectivity bias, which will be discussed in the next paragraphs. 
1. Moral Forgetting 
Behavioral ethics has demonstrated how our interests and motivations 
affect our most basic cognitive skills, such as memory and perception. This 
phenomenon is referred to as “moral forgetting.”36 “For example, within very 
short periods of time, people misremember both what they did and what they 
were told to do, when such misremembering allows them to believe that they 
had acted ethically.”37 Perhaps even more surprisingly, physiological studies 
have demonstrated that motivation affects not just reasoning, 38  but also 
visual capabilities.39 Eye-tracking mechanisms, as well as arousal studies, 
suggest that motivation can affect physiological processes, showing the 
 
 36 See Lisa L. Shu, Francesca Gino & Max H. Bazerman, Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience: When 
Cheating Leads to Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting, 37 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 
BULL. 330, 344 (2011) (“We find that bad behavior motivates moral leniency and leads to the strategic 
forgetting of moral rules.”). For a broader experimental and descriptive analysis of this phenomenon, see 
Maryam Kouchaki & Francesca Gino, Memories of Unethical Actions Become Obfuscated over Time, 
113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 6166, 6166, 6170–71 (2016), concluding that “[i]n nine studies (n = 
2,109), . . . engaging in unethical behavior produces changes in memory so that memories of unethical 
actions gradually become less clear and vivid than memories of ethical actions or other types of actions 
that are either positive or negative in valence.” 
 37 FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 47. 
 38  Regarding the concept of motivated reasoning, see Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated 
Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULL. 480, 480 (1990), and Bersoff, supra note 24, at 28–30, which argues that 
“a redefinition or distorted construal of an unethical action as being morally acceptable often precedes 
and fosters decisions to act in an unethical manner among people generally.” For the framework that 
classifies automatic effect under the concept of motivated reasoning, see FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 47–
48. 
 39 Emily Balcetis & David Dunning, See What You Want to See: Motivational Influences on Visual 
Perception, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 612, 614 (2006). For a more recent account, see Guy 
Hochman, Andreas Glöckner, Susann Fiedler & Shahar Ayal, “I Can See It in Your Eyes”: Biased 
Processing and Increased Arousal in Dishonest Responses, 29 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 322, 323 
(2016). 
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automatic component of self-serving biases on people’s cognitive 
capabilities.40 
A related phenomenon is “moral hypocrisy,” which is our tendency to 
ignore the comparison of our behavior to our preexisting moral standards, 
which can be viewed as an instance of “forgetting” our moral self.41 But 
increasing high-awareness conditions, such as viewing oneself in a mirror, 
has been found to decrease discrepancies between actors’ ethical standards 
and their conduct, i.e., moral forgetting or moral hypocrisy.42 
2. Moral Fatigue 
Other studies have found that the cognitive resources needed for ethical 
behavior are much greater than those needed for unethical behavior, leading 
to “moral fatigue.”43 For example, people who make decisions after a task 
that requires a high level of cognitive resources tend to cheat more on a task 
that follows.44 Similarly, research conducted on response time shows that 
subjects’ responses are more likely to be honest when they are given more 
time.45 Since automatic behavior is associated with shorter response times, 
this research supports the notion that automatic behavior is likely to cause 
people to be less ethical. A recent meta-analysis confirmed the intuitiveness 
of unethicality, at least when there are no clear victims.46 
 
 40 See Andrea Pittarello, Margarita Leib, Tom Gordon-Hecker & Shaul Shalvi, Justifications Shape 
Ethical Blind Spots, 26 PSYCH. SCI. 794, 795 (2015). 
 41 See C. Daniel Batson, Elizabeth R. Thompson, Greg Seuferling, Heather Whitney & Jon A. 
Strongman, Moral Hypocrisy: Appearing Moral to Oneself Without Being So, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. 525, 525–26 (1999). 
 42 See id. at 529–32. 
 43 See Francesca Gino, Maurice E. Schweitzer, Nicole L. Mead & Dan Ariely, Unable to Resist 
Temptation: How Self-Control Depletion Promotes Unethical Behavior, 115 ORG. BEHAV. HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 191, 192 (2011); see also Nicole E. Ruedy & Maurice E. Schweitzer, In the 
Moment: The Effect of Mindfulness on Ethical Decision Making, 95 J. BUS. ETHICS 73, 80–83 (2010) 
(showing experimentally how participants with a higher level of mindfulness cheated to a lesser degree). 
 44 See Gino et al., supra note 43, at 200 (“[W]hen self-control resources are depleted, people do not 
have enough cognitive resources to recognize the moral component of the decision they are facing, and 
thus give into the temptation to cheat.”). 
 45  See Shaul Shalvi, Ori Eldar & Yoella Bereby-Meyer, Honesty Requires Time (and Lack of 
Justifications), 23 PSYCH. SCI. 1264, 1269 (2012) (“[B]eing able to deliberate led people to restrict how 
much they lied or avoid lying altogether. People can behave in an ethical way—they just need time . . . .”). 
 46 Nils C. Köbis, Bruno Verschuere, Yoella Bereby-Meyer, David Rand & Shaul Shalvi, Intuitive 
Honesty Versus Dishonesty: Meta-Analytic Evidence, 14 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 778, 791 (2019); see 
also FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 45–46 (discussing the literature on intuitive cooperativeness and the 
conditions under which intuitive reasoning leads to cooperative behavior); David G. Rand, Joshua D. 
Greene & Martin A. Nowak, Spontaneous Giving and Calculated Greed, 489 NATURE 427, 428–29 
(2012) (showing that people’s immediate response is more cooperative than their reflective response). 
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3. Objectivity Bias 
Individuals who are defined, either by themselves or by others, as 
“objective” are more likely to overlook their own self-interest and thus, 
paradoxically, reach a decision that promotes their self-interest without being 
aware of their actual motivation.47  This phenomenon, called “objectivity 
bias,” has been observed in various professional settings. For instance, a 
study found that individuals who make decisions in a professional capacity 
are more likely to promote their own self-interest. Specifically, the study 
examined how gift-giving impacted managers relative to laypeople with 
respect to how they treat the gift-giver.48 It found that managers are much 
more prone to be affected by the gift due to their greater belief that the gift 
does not affect their judgment owing to their professional capacity.49 This 
effect is a borderline one that sometimes fits into the automatic mechanism 
rubric but at other times fits into the semi-deliberative rubric. The precise 
classification of this effect depends on what takes place on the cognitive 
level: does the effect disable the individual from “seeing” her conflict of 
interest? Or does she enter into cognitive dissonance, but the objectivity bias 
causes her to believe that she can overcome this conflict due to her 
objectivity? 
B. Semi-Deliberative Mechanisms 
The second type of mechanism in behavioral ethics literature is the 
semi-deliberative mechanism. This mechanism mainly applies to situations 
in which individuals are in a state of ethical dissonance.50 In these situations, 
an individual is conscious of the fact that there is some ethical problem with 
the course of action she desires. Yet, certain contextual elements enable her 
to justify her course of action, even though that justification stands on weak 
analytical grounds and would not withstand a careful deliberative process. 
As opposed to the first mechanism, this mechanism is not automatic: the 
actor is more conscious of the ethical aspects of her actions or decisions, yet 
 
 47 See generally Emily Pronin, Thomas Gilovich & Lee Ross, Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: 
Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCH. REV. 781 (2004); Joyce Ehrlinger, 
Thomas Gilovich & Lee Ross, Peering into the Bias Blind Spot: People’s Assessments of Bias in 
Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 680 (2005). For a broader account of the 
problem with people’s inability to recognize the problems in their own decision-making process, see 
generally CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY WE 
JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS (2015). 
 48 Sunita Sah & Richard Paul Larrick, A Sense of Professionalism Predicts Increased Acceptance 
and Influence from Conflicts of Interest 3–4 (2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with journal). 
 49 Id. at 13–14. 
 50 See Mazar et al., supra note 24, at 634; Sah & Larrick, supra note 48, at 13–14. 
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limited in her ability to objectively evaluate their ethicality. This mechanism 
exemplifies motivated reasoning in the strong sense: mental processes do not 
prevent an individual from having conscious ethical awareness of the 
complexity of the situation; rather, a mechanism in which the internal 
motivation alters conscious reasoning does. Semi-deliberative mechanisms 
will be demonstrated in the following three contexts: subtle conflicts of 
interest, doing things for others, and vague circumstances. 
1. Subtle Conflicts of Interest 
The paradigm of the ethical dissonance developed above, 51  where 
people attempt to find a balance between their conception of ethics and their 
material self-interest, is best exemplified in the conflict-of-interest context. 
According to this paradigm, people misbehave only to the extent that they 
can maintain their self-conception of being honest. 52  When conflicts of 
interest are too obvious, people have a more difficult time justifying or 
ignoring their existence. But when the conflict of interest is less stark, an 
individual can justify her behavior more easily and disregard her conflict of 
interest.53 Behavioral ethics predicts that an increase in an individual’s own 
interest in a conflict of interest would decrease, rather than increase, the 
probability that she would promote her own interest.54 This prediction is 
diametrically opposed to the standard assumption of economic analysis of 
law.55 
There are two dimensions in which conflicts of interest could be subtle: 
magnitude and quality. In addition to the level of personal interest, the 
salience of the conflict of interest could be sensitive to the type of personal 
 
 51 See Mazar et al., supra note 24, at 634. 
 52 See FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 193–94; see also Yuval Feldman & Eliran Halali, Regulating 
“Good” People in Subtle Conflicts of Interest Situations, 154 J. BUS. ETHICS 65, 67, 70, 75–77 (2019) 
(conducting a “revolving doors” experiment, in which participants are told that there is a chance that the 
center conducting the experiment will take them again with a higher relative pay if satisfied with their 
evaluations of the center, causing them to give higher evaluations of the center than other individuals, but 
not causing them to give higher personal evaluations of the researcher conducting the experiment or the 
pay he should receive, even though such evaluation may assist them more in securing their participation 
in the next experiment); Eyal Zamir & Raanan Sulitzeanu‐Kenan, Explaining Self‐Interested Behavior of 
Public‐Spirited Policy Makers, 78 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 579, 580 (2017) (“[W]hen a conflict of interest is 
clear and unmistakable, officials are more likely to recognize and control their automatic tendency to 
advance their own interests. Thus, it is the less obvious cases of conflict of interest that pose a greater 
threat to a well-functioning public administration.”). 
 53 See sources cited supra note 52. 
 54 FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 102–03. 
 55 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 
176 (1968) (suggesting that increasing the uncertainty of incurring the sanction for criminal activity by 
reducing enforcement, while offsetting it by increasing the penalty, could still increase crime deterrence 
overall because most people’s risk aversion). 
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interest. For instance, monetary conflicts of interest are more salient than 
nonmonetary conflicts of interest that involve friendship or status.56 As a 
consequence, ethical people may be reluctant to promote their self-interest 
when the conflict involves money, but are willing to act in their self-interest 
when the conflict is nonmonetary—like when it implicates favoring a 
friend.57 This stands in contrast to the traditional approach to self-interest,58 
which maintains that transactions involving a monetary conflict of interest 
are more severe and should therefore receive greater scrutiny. 59 
Nonmonetary rewards are open to interpretation since it could be argued that 
they have not actually benefited the wrongdoer.60 For example, a doctor may 
not be willing to receive cash payments to promote a drug, but if invited to 
give a keynote address in a conference, she might justify the invitation not 
as compensation for her services, but rather as an honest expression of 
interest in her research.61 
2. Doing Things for Others 
Behavioral ethics has found that some individuals are more likely to 
behave unethically when acting for others than for themselves.62 In contrast 
to the rational-choice paradigm, where the individual’s own gain from the 
wrongdoing increases the likelihood that she would engage in such behavior, 
behavioral ethics maintains that the gain to others may be even more 
powerful in affecting the agent’s proclivity to commit wrongdoing. 
In one experiment, individuals in charge of grading others’ performance 
in problem-solving tests tended to inflate the performance of “poor” 
solvers—those who had lost in a lottery just beforehand—even when it 
decreased their own payment. 63  Other experiments have concluded that 
people are more likely to cheat when the benefits are split with another 
 
 56  See Yuval Feldman, Rebecca Gauthier & Troy Schuler, Curbing Misconduct in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: Insights from Behavioral Ethics and the Behavioral Approach to Law, 41 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 620, 622–26 (2013) (discussing the different self-interested motivations of 
pharmaceutical executives and researchers, the different types of conflicts of interest created, and the 
different regulatory solutions required). 
 57 See James Heyman & Dan Ariely, Effort for Payment: A Tale of Two Markets, 15 PSYCH. SCI. 
787, 787, 793 (2004). 
 58 Michael C. Jensen, Self‐Interest, Altruism, Incentives and Agency Theory, 7 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 
40, 42 (1994). 
 59 See FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 103. 
 60 See id. at 102–03. 
 61 See Feldman, Gauthier & Schuler, supra note 56, at 622. 
 62 FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 197–98. 
 63 Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, Dishonesty in the Name of Equity, 20 PSYCH. SCI. 1153, 1155, 
1157–59 (2009). 
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person than when they capture the full benefit. 64  The behavioral ethics 
explanation of this phenomenon is that people can justify their wrongdoing 
and maintain their ethical self-conception by referring to the benefit to others 
as their actual motivation; they are not focused on their own self-interest and 
thus are not themselves a “bad person.”65 
3. Vagueness 
Studies show that vagueness and uncertainty, whether factual or 
moral,66 increase the likelihood that people would engage in wrongdoing.67 
For example, experiments have concluded that the probability of a promisor 
adopting a self-serving interpretation of an ambiguous provision in a contract 
is much greater in the setting of a loss than in the setting of a gain.68 The 
behavioral ethics explanation for this conduct is that ambiguity provides an 
individual with “moral wiggle room,” which increases her ability to justify 
her behavior and maintain her ethical self-conception, as long as there is 
some view under which her actions are ethical.69 
A further example of this phenomenon can be seen in a series of 
experiments that examined a game in which a “dictator” could choose a 
payoff of $5 or $6, matched with an uncertain payoff of either $1 or $5 to 
 
 64 See, e.g., Scott S. Wiltermuth, Cheating More when the Spoils Are Split, 115 ORG. BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 157, 166 (2011) (“[P]eople may actually be more likely to behave unethically 
when they do not capture all the benefits that the unethical behavior yields.”). 
 65 See id. at 167; see also Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-
Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RSCH. 223, 228–29 (2004) (suggesting a former tech 
CEO believed his fraudulent behavior was “appropriate” because it was intended to help the company). 
 66 See Maurice E. Schweitzer & Christopher K. Hsee, Stretching the Truth: Elastic Justification and 
Motivated Communication of Uncertain Information, 25 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 185, 99–198 (2002) 
(“Our results demonstrate that the elasticity of private information plays an important role in the deception 
decision process . . . .”). For a normative discussion of such an effect, see Yuval Feldman & Henry E. 
Smith, Behavioral Equity, 170 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 137, 146–47 (2014). 
 67 See Yuval Feldman, Amos Schurr & Doron Teichman, Reference Points and Contractual Choices: 
An Experimental Examination, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 512, 532–34 (2013) (showing “the 
importance of prospect theory to understanding the way parties to contracts interpret vague obligations”); 
see also Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 980, 1000–02 (2009) (“Participants faced with legal uncertainty were more inclined to violate the 
law.”); Yuval Feldman & Alon Harel, Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An 
Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 81, 104–05 (2008) 
(“Standards give people the opportunity to interpret reality in a way that supports their self-interest and 
hence both noncompliance norms . . . and high gains . . . exert a greater effect when people are faced with 
ambiguous legal norms.”). 
 68 Feldman et al., supra note 67, at 533 (“When people are in the realm of losses, they tend to interpret 
their contractual obligations more selfishly, whereas when they are in the domain of gains, they are more 
likely to interpret their obligations in a more cooperative fashion.”). 
 69 Jason Dana, Roberto A. Weber & Jason Xi Kuang, Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: Experiments 
Demonstrating an Illusory Preference for Fairness, 33 ECON. THEORY 67, 69, 77–78 (2007). 
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the opposing player, which was generated by an external lottery.70 Before 
choosing the payoffs, “dictators” were given a chance to see the lottery 
results, so they would know the implication for the opposing player. Most 
“dictators” chose not to receive this information, a behavior interpreted by 
the authors as a preference for “moral wiggle room” that enables a more 
favorable ethical construction of their choice.71 The finding that vagueness 
exacerbates wrongdoing and promotes self-interest is not trivial: it stands in 
contrast to conventional economic analysis, according to which greater 
uncertainty with the same expected sanction should increase deterrence and 
limit wrongdoing.72 
C. The Relevance of Behavioral Ethics to Law in General and Corporate 
Law in Particular 
As one of us recently argued, the field of behavioral ethics has 
important implications for law and legal analysis. 73  One of the primary 
objectives of the law is to assure that individuals do not sacrifice the interests 
of others at the altar of their own self-interest. According to law-and-
economics scholars, this is true of all legal fields. Contract law restrains 
individuals from breaching contracts when it serves their interest at the 
expense of the greater social benefit of trustful contracting; 74  tort law 
requires individuals to incur the costs of precautionary measures if they are 
lower than the expected cost of harm;75 criminal law prohibits individuals 
from promoting their own desires and interests at the expense of victims.76 
In short, conventional economic theory assumes that the law is built around 
a conventional model of homo economicus, a person willing to promote her 
 
 70 Id. at 71. 
 71 See id. at 74–76. 
 72 See, e.g., Feldman & Smith, supra note 66, at 152–53 (arguing self-interested, “bad-faith” actors 
are less likely to evade the law if its rules are unclear); Nuno Garoupa, Optimal Law Enforcement when 
Victims Are Rational Players, in CONFLICT AND GOVERNANCE 123, 124, 132 (Amihai Glazer & Kai A. 
Konrad eds., 2003) (arguing that all else being equal, deterrence of crime increases as the certainty of 
payoffs for committing crimes decreases); Nuno Garoupa, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Crime: A 
Critical Review, 15 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 5, 9–10 (2003) (“[I]n the classical law and economics, individuals 
bear a risk premium because there is a probability of sanctioning between zero and one. In the behavioral 
approach, individuals also bear an ambiguity premium due to the fact that the probability of being 
sanctioned is itself uncertain.”); Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties when the Law Is 
Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241, 242–47 (2007) (arguing that the legal uncertainty in tax law together 
with risk aversion can explain the overcompliance observed in tax law). 
 73 FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 8–12. 
 74 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 297–98 (2004). 
 75 See id. at 180. 
 76 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 216 (7th ed. 2007). 
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own interest at the expense of the public interest.77 The law’s goal is to 
maintain this inclination by imposing sanctions on individual actors in order 
to alter the costs and benefits associated with various courses of action, and 
thereby induce self-interest-maximizers to behave in a socially desirable 
manner.78 
The findings of behavioral ethics challenge this framework. These 
findings include a dominant pattern of individuals not acting in an entirely 
self-interested manner at the expense of others. Rather, individuals have been 
shown to consciously want to be sensitive to the interests of others and, in 
many cases, actually act according to those principles. In many other cases, 
though, they end up promoting their own self-interest despite their 
benevolent, other-regarding motivation. Imposing penalties on these actors 
is likely to be ineffective. They are not calculative wrongdoers to start with, 
and thus adding an additional personal cost would not necessarily alter their 
behavior.79 
The behavioral ethics literature identifies the mechanisms that enable 
“good people,” those who are sensitive to the interests of others, to ignore or 
justify to themselves why their actions are not wrong and why they do not 
harm others illegitimately. In many cases, the same conditions that diminish 
the wrongdoing of “good people” are conditions that conventional economic 
analysis points to as exacerbating wrongdoing. For example, according to 
conventional law and economics, disclosure reduces wrongdoing by 
increasing the probability of detection.80 Accordingly, if a doctor discloses 
her conflict of interest with a drug company, she will have a lesser tendency 
to prescribe its drug to a patient when it does not serve the patient’s interests. 
Once the patient becomes aware of the ties between the drug company and 
the doctor, the patient will become suspicious of the doctor’s motives and 
will be more likely to detect instances in which the doctor prescribes the drug 
out of her own self-interest. Behavioral ethics suggests that disclosure may 
 
 77  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458–60 (1897) 
(describing a similar view that the primary function of law, according to Justice Holmes, is to restrict the 
bad man’s behavior). 
 78 See Becker, supra note 55, at 209. 
 79 See FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 58–61. 
 80 Regarding the influence of probability of detection on deterrence, see Becker, supra note 55, at 
205–06. Regarding disclosure as an effective regulatory mechanism, see Colin Camerer, Samuel 
Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: 
Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L REV. 1211, 1232–35 
(2003), and Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1183 (2003). But see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 679–729 (2011) (explaining why “mandated disclosure regularly . . . 
fails to achieve its purpose of improving disclosees’ decisions”). 
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have the opposite effect: if the doctor is a “good person” who does not want 
to take advantage of others consciously, disclosure may increase her 
tendency to prescribe the drug to patients even when it is not optimal to do 
so. The disclosure notifies the patient of the doctor’s conflict of interest, 
thereby enabling the doctor to promote the drug while maintaining her 
ethical self-conception.81 
The same is also true of vague legal rules.82 Standard economic analysis 
points out that vague legal rules may increase deterrence because of risk 
aversion. Assuming two parallel regimes with the same expected sanction, 
economists would conclude that people will be more deterred by the 
uncertain legal regime under which there could be no sanction at all or a very 
high penalty, rather than by the alternative regime under which a lower 
sanction will be imposed but with a much higher probability. 83  The 
behavioral ethics literature reaches the opposite conclusion. “Good people” 
tend to engage in greater wrongdoing when it is possible to interpret the 
action as legitimate, even though it introduces uncertainty as to the expected 
sanction.84 Good people can justify their actions due to the vagueness of the 
legal norms, allowing them to adopt a lenient interpretation of their behavior 
and weakening their internal aversion to wrongdoing.85 
II. APPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL ETHICS TO ISSUES IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
The strong relevance of behavioral ethics to the law has been 
powerfully demonstrated.86 There is a strong reason to believe that of all 
legal fields, the findings of legal ethics are most relevant to corporate law. 
The two central features of corporate law—agency and group decision-
making—make it an ideal setting for the application of the insights of 
behavioral ethics.87 The behavioral ethics literature suggests that wrongdoing 
intensifies when there is a veil of anonymity between the wrongdoer and the 
actual victim. This condition exists in all public corporations, where agents 
are required to make decisions on behalf of anonymous shareholders. The 
 
 81 See Marc A. Rodwin, Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest: The Limitations of Disclosure, 321 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1405, 1405 (1989). 
 82 See infra Section I.A.2. 
 83 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 84 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 85 FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 158–61. 
 86 See generally FELDMAN, supra note 17 (using empirical analysis to show that “good people” can 
be led to violate laws if they can rationalize their actions within their own moral framework, and that 
understanding this behavior can be used to develop more efficient enforcement regimes). 
 87 See sources cited infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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behavioral ethics literature also teaches that group decision-making leads to 
diluted notions of responsibility and facilitates behavior by agents that 
disregards their legal duties.88 It is therefore surprising that, until recently, 
corporate law has gone under the radar of behavioral ethics. In the 
paragraphs to come, we seek to fill this gap. This Part will systematically 
examine the full range of behavioral ethics effects that are relevant to the 
corporate context, targeting two loci of corporate governance: structural 
applications, such as board design, and procedural applications, such as 
corporate decision-making processes. It will demonstrate how the behavioral 
ethics perspective sheds new light on these two elements of corporate 
governance. It will both underscore new sources of potential wrongdoing in 
corporations and suggest novel mechanisms for addressing them. 
A. Structural Applications 
We begin our discussion of the applications of behavioral ethics to 
corporate law by analyzing the structural implications. By “structural,” we 
refer to the institutional design of corporations as prescribed by law. 
Specifically, we examine voting and group decisions, vagueness in corporate 
law, partial dependence of independent directors, and transgressions for the 
sake of others. We show that behavioral ethics research provides important 
insights into each of these aspects and points to a set of policy interventions 
that differs from the legal norms currently in use. 
1. Implications of Group Decision-Making 
The central organ of the firm is the board. As Professor Stephen 
Bainbridge puts it, “At the apex of the corporate hierarchy stands not a single 
individual but a collective—the board of directors.” 89  Consequently, the 
most important decisions are a product of a board’s group decision-making 
process. This is not a by-product of the board structure but rather its primary 
purpose. As noted in the commentary of the Model Business Corporation 
Act, 
A well-established principle of corporate common law accepted by implication 
in the Model Act is that directors may act only at a meeting unless otherwise 
 
 88 See sources cited infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 89 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 85 (3d ed. 2015); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
The Board of Directors, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 275, 275 
(Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (describing the development and importance of the 
board of directors in Anglo-American law). 
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expressly authorized by statute. The underlying theory is that the consultation 
and exchange of views is an integral part of the functioning of the board.90 
The treatment of the board as a unitary whole has other legal 
implications. As many corporate scholars have noted, “in cases involving 
breaches of the duty of care, courts tend to treat the board as a unitary whole 
and assign responsibility to all directors collectively.”91 
Behavioral ethics has underscored several problematic features of 
group decision-making processes.92 For example, it reveals that individuals 
are more likely to engage in wrongdoing when they work in pairs than when 
working alone, a phenomenon labeled in the literature as “dishonesty shift.”93 
There are four possible explanations for this phenomenon. 94  The first 
explanation suggests that people are more likely to behave dishonestly when 
their actions benefit others, an explanation known as “payoff 
 
 90 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.20, at 8-120 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008). The same approach has 
also been adopted in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which notes that a director “has no power of 
his own to act on the corporation’s behalf, but only as one of the body of directors acting as a board.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1958). This principle is also reflected 
in Delaware law: “The vote of the majority of the directors present at a meeting at which a quorum is 
present shall be the act of the board of directors . . . .” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (current through 
82 Del. Laws, ch. 281). 
 91 Asaf Eckstein & Gideon Parchomovsky, Toward a Horizontal Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 
104 CORNELL L. REV. 803, 808 (2019). Some scholars distinguish between violations of the duty of care, 
which are likely to involve the entire board, and violations of the duty of loyalty, which tend to be limited 
to certain directors that have benefited from a transaction. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance 
in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1178 n.39 (1990). Regarding the murky 
boundaries under existing law between individual and collective liability for directors, see generally 
Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Directors?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 929 
(2008). 
 92  See Matthias Sutter, Deception Through Telling the Truth?! Experimental Evidence from 
Individuals and Teams, 119 ECON. J. 47, 57 (2009) (observing “more deception through sophisticated 
truth-telling by teams than by individuals”); Ori Weisel & Shaul Shalvi, The Collaborative Roots of 
Corruption, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 10651, 10655 (2015) (“A collaborative setting led people 
to engage in excessive dishonest behavior.”); Julian Conrads, Bernd Irlenbusch, Rainer Michael Rilke & 
Gari Walkowitz, Lying and Team Incentives, 34 J. ECON. PSYCH. 1, 7 (2013) (finding “that lying is . . . 
more pronounced under team[s] . . . than individual[s]”); Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider & Niklas 
Wallmeier, Gender Differences in Honesty: Groups Versus Individuals, 128 ECON. LETTERS 25, 26–27 
(2015) (researching gender differences in lying and finding all-male groups and mixed male–female 
groups lied more frequently than individuals or all-female groups); FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 202 
(discussing Professors  Ori Weisel and Shaul Shalvi’s research and how “when people work together in 
dyads . . . they are more likely to engage in wrongdoing than they would have individually”). 
 93 Martin G. Kocher, Simeon Schudy & Lisa Spantig, I Lie? We Lie! Why? Experimental Evidence 
on a Dishonesty Shift in Groups, 64 MGMT. SCI. 3995, 3996 (2018). 
 94 See Francesca Gino, Shahar Ayal & Dan Ariely, Self-Serving Altruism? The Lure of Unethical 
Actions that Benefit Others, 93 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 285, 291 (2013); Jörg Gross, Margarita Leib, 
Theo Offerman & Shaul Shalvi, Ethical Free Riding: When Honest People Find Dishonest Partners, 
29 PSYCH. SCI. 1956, 1957 (2018); Kocher et al., supra note 93, at 3996. 
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commonality.”95 The second explanation is “the decreased observability of 
one’s actions within a group.”96 The third is that group deliberation processes 
are more fruitful in generating arguments justifying dishonesty. 97  This 
explanation is supported by the fact that increased dishonesty in groups 
occurs even when the first two explanations do not occur. 98  The fourth 
explanation is that in group settings, the responsibility for misconduct falls 
on the shoulders of others, an effect called “ethical free riding.”99 At least 
one study indicates that even people who are honest in their individual 
choices might not object when a dishonest partner lies to help them get more 
money.100 
The increased tendency to engage in dishonest behavior in group 
settings poses a serious problem in the corporate context. As noted above, 
the collective nature of boards is one of the core structural features of 
corporations. The common wisdom behind much of corporate governance 
suggests that group deliberation promotes sound decision-making, 101  an 
assumption directly challenged by behavioral ethics. The findings of 
behavioral ethics imply that there is a need to curtail the structural ethical 
failures of corporate boards’ decision-making processes to prevent 
dishonesty and self-promotion by board members at the expense of the 
corporation. There are a few ways to diminish the collective decision-making 
structure of the board—and the accompanying negative implications—that 
stop short of abolishing group decision-making altogether in corporations. 
 
 95 Kocher et al., supra note 93, at 3998. 
 96 Id. at 3996. 
 97 See id. at 4004. 
 98 See id. at 4005. In an experiment, an individual watched a video of a die being rolled and received 
a higher payment when the number they reported observing was higher. Id. at 3997. They compared 
reported numbers when decisions were made individually to those when individuals decided collectively 
what to report, and still found statistically significant higher dishonesty in the group context. Id. at 4000. 
Their conclusion—that the deliberation process in the group setting, through the exchange of moral views 
and arguments, generated greater justification for dishonesty—was reinforced by the group 
communications. Id. at 4005. They found more arguments for dishonesty when analyzing the 
conversations between the group members than in the individual setting where individuals were asked to 
write down their thoughts before reporting. Id. at 4004–06. 
 99 Gross et al., supra note 94, at 1957 (“We label this behavior ethical free riding, which we define 
as intentionally benefiting from other people’s rule-violating behavior without violating rules oneself.”). 
 100 Id. at 1961–62 (“Results revealed that honest first movers systematically engaged in ethical free 
riding . . . . Honest first movers were less likely to ask to switch when their partner (the second mover) 
was a liar versus an honest person . . . .”). Other explanations that have not been raised in the literature 
are also possible. For example, individuals may perceive themselves as less responsible for dishonest 
behavior when it stems from a group interaction even when others can observe their dishonesty in the 
group context. 
 101 See sources cited supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1148 
First, corporate decisions could be made in a two-tiered structure. 
Before the board can consider a certain issue, an individual member of the 
board must approve it. While this may sound impractical, it is not that 
different from current board practices that delegate certain issues to 
subcommittees, such as the compensation and audit committees that are 
comprised of board members.102 We recommend the same mechanism but 
with responsibility assigned to individuals, rather than subcommittees, to 
increase personal accountability for the board’s decisions. Individual 
decisions would be free from the “group effects” discussed above. Our 
mechanism would therefore curtail both sources of group effects: the greater 
justification for dishonesty that group deliberation generates, and the dilution 
of responsibility. Unlike subcommittees, whose approval is mandatory, the 
decisions of individual directors would be subject to board reversal, making 
them more of a recommendation than a binding decision—after all, it would 
be highly problematic and paralyzing if one individual were to have veto 
power over important decisions of the firm. 
Second, differential responsibility could be assigned among directors. 
For example, director A would bear the potential legal responsibility 
associated with decision X that falls under her area of specialization, while 
director B would be responsible for decisions Y and Z that fall under her 
fields of expertise. Differential assignment would dramatically ameliorate 
the “group effects” of payoff commonality and dilution of responsibility.103 
Varying the expected costs borne by each director as a result of wrongdoing 
would make individual directors more conscious of their corporate roles and 
responsibilities. It would also break the unitary structure that generates the 
diffusion of responsibility among individual directors. 
While it is possible for a court to assign different levels of responsibility 
to different directors after the fact, it is rarely done.104 To achieve a more 
effective differentiation among directors, there should be an ex ante process 
that defines how particular directors will be responsible for particular types 
 
 102 In the NYSE Listed Company Manual, all public companies listed on the NYSE must have a 
compensation committee and an audit committee, both comprised solely from independent directors. The 
compensation committee is responsible for reviewing and approving CEO compensation and making 
recommendations for non-CEO compensation. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 303A.05, 
303A.06 [hereinafter NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL], https://nyse.wolterskluwer.cloud/ 
listed-company-manual  [https://perma.cc/ZM7M-JCZB] (follow “Section 3 Corporate Responsibility” 
hyperlink, then either scroll down to 303A.05, 303A.06, or click those sections on the left-hand menu). 
Many companies have other committees that are not mandated by any entity, such as environmental 
committees and social responsibility committees, that review the firm’s policies and make 
recommendations to the board regarding these issues. 
 103 See Kocher et al., supra note 93, at 4006. 
 104 See Eckstein & Parchomovsky, supra note 91, at 826. 
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of wrongdoing. For example, a director with a financial background could 
be liable for financial misreporting, while the chairman of the compensation 
committee could be accountable for any excess compensation. The relevant 
director could be held exclusively responsible or more responsible than 
others, and that would break the payoff commonality of board members 
derived from the specific wrongdoing. 
A less extreme variant of the previous proposal might be to adopt a 
framework of horizontal fiduciary duties. 105  Horizontal fiduciary duties 
would enable directors to sue other directors for their wrongdoing that 
resulted in the corporation’s wrongdoing. While this proposal has been 
justified on different grounds,106 it also has the ability to address the ethical 
failures associated with group decision-making. It curtails the unitary 
structure of the board by imposing on each board member a duty toward the 
other board members. It further transforms the decisions of the board into 
individual decisions of the directors who comprise it by establishing 
individual liability on the part of board members to one another. 
2. Inherent Vagueness in Corporate Law 
As suggested in Part I, the behavioral ethics literature reveals that 
individuals tend to promote their self-interest when facing factual or legal 
ambiguity. 107  According to the behavioral ethics literature, this happens 
because vagueness enables actors to justify their self-interested behavior, 
which scholars have labeled “elastic justification.”108 The legal implications 
of this are far-reaching. This finding reinforces the view that the legal system 
in general should be based, as much as possible, on rules rather than 
standards, and that those rules should be clear and unambiguous.109 And the 
vagueness effect is especially relevant to the corporate context because of 
two of the corporate context’s distinctive features: multiple stakeholders 
trying to pursue the interests of all the firm’s constituents and the multiple 
avenues to maximize those interests. 
 
 105 See id. at 841–47. 
 106 See id. at 853 (justifying horizontal fiduciary duties as a way to improve corporate boards’ 
functioning ex ante and allowing individual directors to exonerate themselves ex post when they did not 
do wrong but other directors did). 
 107 See supra Section I.B.3. 
 108 See Schweitzer & Hsee, supra note 66, at 188 (“According to elastic justification, decisions are 
influenced not only by justifiable factors (those which decision makers believe they should take into 
consideration), but also unjustifiable factors (those which decision makers are motivated to take into 
consideration but do not believe they should).”). 
 109 See FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 184–85. 
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The first source of vagueness concerns is rooted in multiple corporate 
stakeholders and purposes of the firm. One school of thought puts 
stakeholder interests on par with those of shareholders.110 According to it, the 
purpose of the firm is not solely to maximize shareholder profits, but also to 
pursue the interests of its workers, customers, lenders, the community in 
which it is located, and society at large. The vagueness created by the 
multiple parties whose interests the firm is obliged to further enables an agent 
to justify actions that are not aligned with the interests of shareholders, for 
example, via the adoption of more conservative policies than those that 
shareholders might want. And an agent, who may also have a stakeholder 
interest, is invited to interpret permissible corporate actions more broadly to 
further their own self-interest without clear guidelines. 
The second source of vagueness concerns the best means to promote a 
corporation’s business objective. Even assuming that a corporation’s 
objective is profit-maximization, questions arise as to how best to 
accomplish this goal. Should the company spend more on advertising and 
 
 110 One of the earliest proponents of the stakeholder view was Merrick Dodd, who had a well-known 
dispute with Adolf Berle, the chief proponent of the shareholder-primacy view. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., 
For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1154–56 (1932) (“[T]hose who 
manage our business corporations should concern themselves with the interests of employees, consumers, 
and the general public, as well as of the stockholders . . . .”). A new wave in support of the stakeholder 
view rose in the late 1970s and early 1980s in response to a variety of changing social and business 
conditions. See R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective 
on Corporate Governance, 25 CAL. MGMT. REV. 88, 90 (1983); see also R. EDWARD FREEMAN, 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 90 (1984) (discussing the social factors that 
gave rise to the stakeholder view). The stakeholder theory of corporate law became a common topic for 
legal symposia in the early 1990s. See, e.g., Symposium, The Corporate Stakeholder Conference: 
Introduction, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 297, 298 (1993) (declaring the conference’s goal “was to help bridge 
the distance between the disciplines of corporate and labour law and theory and to contribute to a dialogue 
that could be mutually beneficial”); Symposium, New Directions in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1373 (1993) (reflecting the overarching theme of Professor David Millon’s 1993 article, New 
Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law). 
Scholarship in support of the stakeholder view continues to be published to this day. See, e.g., Lynn A. 
Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 
(2002) (arguing that some of the most frequently raised arguments for shareholder primacy are inaccurate, 
incorrect, and unpersuasive); Thomas A. Kochan & Saul A. Rubinstein, Toward a Stakeholder Theory of 
the Firm: The Saturn Partnership, 11 ORG. SCI. 367, 384 (2000) (urging organizational researchers to 
“rethink[] basic concepts and practices” in order to give stakeholders a greater voice in corporate decision-
making); Justin Blount, Creating a Stakeholder Democracy Under Existing Corporate Law, 18 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 365, 365, 366–370 (2016) (indicating the issue of private ordering and arguing that “since 
corporate law is largely enabling rather than mandatory,” stakeholder governance structures can “be 
voluntarily created within the current shareholder-centric default corporate law structure”); Iris H-Y Chiu, 
Operationalising a Stakeholder Conception in Company Law, 10 LAW & FIN. MKTS. REV. 173, 173 
(2016) (arguing that “the shareholder primacy-led foundations for UK company law should be revisited, 
and that the adoption of a stakeholder conception in company law can be both normatively and positively 
supported”). 
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promoting its services or goods, or should it cut those costs? Should it spend 
more on salaries in order to recruit better talent, or should it reduce payroll 
costs? The source of this uncertainty is factual, but it has legal 
implications.111 This vagueness over the appropriate business course for the 
firm may cause management to choose a path or policy that is aligned with 
its own self-interest, even though it is suboptimal for the firm. 
The most straightforward way to address the adverse effects of 
vagueness is via the adoption and implementation of clearer norms of 
conduct. For instance, it would be desirable to clearly define the objective of 
corporations and set bright-line rules regarding expenses and 
 
 111 The Delaware Supreme Court, which in regard to corporate law is the most important jurisdiction 
in the United States and where around half of U.S. corporations are incorporated, seems to have accepted 
the shareholder-primacy view. It has stated that “[t]he board of directors has the legal responsibility to 
manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.” Malone v. Brincat, 
722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998); see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
182 (Del. 1986) (“[C]oncern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active 
bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to 
sell it to the highest bidder.”). Even the Delaware Supreme Court has permitted directors in some cases 
to make decisions that seem to diverge from shareholders’ interests and that benefit other constituencies 
at their expense. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1989) 
(denying shareholders of Time Inc. an injunction against a merger with Warner Communication, Inc. 
despite Time shareholders’ interest in pursuing potentially more lucrative offers). Yet as Professor Lynn 
Stout has pointed out, courts have done so using shareholder-primacy rhetoric, hoping that in the long 
run it will also benefit the shareholders in some way. See Stout, supra note 110, at 1203. Many other 
scholars hold that the dominant view of the corporation’s purpose in the United States is shareholder-
oriented, a view originally stated by Adolf Berle. See A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers 
Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932) (“I submit that you can not abandon emphasis 
on ‘the view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders’ 
until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities 
to someone else.”); see also Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas 
of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 42–46 (2004) (discussing Milton Friedman's 
contributions to the stakeholder theory); Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, 
and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 8–9 (2001) (comparing the value-
maximization and stakeholder theories of the corporate objective and outlining a different theory called 
“enlightened stakeholder value,” which purports to unify the two theories); Virginia Harper Ho, 
“Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder–Stakeholder Divide, 
36 J. CORP. L. 59, 72 (2010). Recently, the shareholder primacy view has undergone a reformulation from 
focusing on the maximization of profits to shareholder welfare. See Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, 
Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L., FIN. & ACCT. 247, 247 
(2017) (“We argue that maximization of shareholder welfare is not the same as maximization of market 
value. We propose that company and asset managers should pursue policies consistent with the 
preferences of their investors.”). Regarding the implications of this view on corporate governance, see 
Adi Libson, Taking Shareholders’ Social Preferences Seriously: Confronting a New Agency Problem, 
9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 699, 707–12 (2019), which points to a possible new agency problem between 
shareholders and management in corporations’ pursuit of social objectives desired by the shareholders 
and how it can be addressed. 
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compensation. 112  Yet such methods may be unrealistic in the corporate 
setting—if one accepts the stakeholder view,113 the standards may have to 
remain vague. Moreover, sacrificing flexibility may be too high a price to 
pay to eliminate vagueness, at least from a business perspective. 
An alternative way of reducing vagueness is by relying more heavily 
on ex ante mechanisms than on ex post ones.114 Ex post mechanisms focus 
on the individual’s after-the-fact liability. The threat of liability after the fact 
is intended to affect the individual’s ex ante calculations and generate 
deterrence. Yet if individuals are not fully aware of their wrongdoing in the 
first place, ex post mechanisms are less effective in curtailing antisocial 
behavior.115 Furthermore, ex post mechanisms require evidence, and in cases 
of subtle wrongdoing, it is much more complicated to collect such 
evidence.116 The vagueness that accompanies ex post mechanisms indicates 
that fiduciary duties may also be ineffective in curbing conflicts of interest. 
Because of the uncertainty that comes with ex post liability, the agent will 
tend to interpret the duty as congruent with her actions, which renders the 
efficacy of fiduciary duties and potential liability quite limited.117 
But there are still several instances in which ex ante mechanisms can 
remediate ethical failures. First, managers and boards could be required to 
receive shareholder approval in advance for certain gray-area actions, like 
compensation increases or setting compensation at a certain ratio.118 
 
 112 This is not as far-fetched as it may seem: best practices for setting compensation and other issues 
partially fulfill this function. Regarding a description of the best practices advised by the NYSE and 
NASDAQ, see WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, COMPENSATION COMMITTEE GUIDE 5–9 (2017), 
https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.25540.17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U2W9-26MA]. 
 113 See sources cited supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 114 FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 206. 
 115 See id. at xii. 
 116 See id. 
 117 However, it is important to recognize that in the last year or so, a few studies by Professor Uri 
Gneezy and his coauthors showed that when incentives are designed effectively and behavior of an agent 
is observable, incentives could have an effect even on subtle unethical behavior. See, e.g., Agne 
Kajackaite & Uri Gneezy, Incentives and Cheating, 102 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 433, 434 (2017) 
(showing “that in a mind game the tendency to lie increases with incentives, indicating that some of our 
participants have positive and finite intrinsic costs of lying”); Uri Gneezy, Agne Kajackatie & Joel Sobel, 
Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 419, 420 (2018) (“We argue that the intrinsic 
cost of lying depends on the size of the lie and identify three different ways to measure this size: the 
payoff dimension . . . , the outcome dimension . . . , and the likelihood dimension . . . .”). 
 118 The SEC has recently implemented the Dodd–Frank rule that companies have to disclose the ratio 
between the compensation of the principal executive officer, typically the CEO, and the average worker 
in the firm. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(u) (2020); see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Interpretive 
Guidance on Pay Ratio Rule (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-172 
[https://perma.cc/FSV3-YBAC] (describing the rule that was implemented in 2018). Other jurisdictions 
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A second option is the utilization of catalogs—enumerations of specific 
instances of conflicts of interest that management and directors would have 
to check as part of their disclosure protocol. The catalog would be 
nonexhaustive, but the specific items on it would focus the attention of 
managers and directors on the type of activities with which they ought to be 
concerned. As Professor Alex Stein and one of us recently noted, one of the 
primary advantages of catalogs is their ability to reduce uncertainty.119 For 
example, suppose that when making a charitable contribution, a CEO would 
have to complete a document inquiring into whether she received personal 
services from a charity, whether she has a relative working for the charity, 
whether she worked for the charity in the past or did business with it, and so 
on. The list could even contain scenarios that are not prohibited by law—like 
whether the charity employs a relative of the donor—to sensitize the 
respondent to the kind of issues of which she ought to be aware. 
3. The Curse of Partial Dependence 
Many fields have adopted a perspective of harm reduction that focuses 
on decreasing the expected harm from a certain activity.120 Yet by adopting 
the harm-reduction approach, policymakers might inadvertently create a 
situation in which more “good people” are likely able to justify engaging in 
harmful behavior.121 Consider electronic cigarettes. From a harm reduction 
perspective, it is safer for smokers to switch to electronic cigarettes, which 
studies suggest may be healthier.122 However, the aggregate social effects of 
electronic cigarettes is unclear, as they may have induced many nonsmokers, 
who had avoided regular cigarettes, to try electronic cigarettes.123 Similarly, 
 
have passed more aggressive laws that do not settle for disclosing the gap, but also tax at a higher rate 
any executive compensation that exceeds a certain proportion in relation to the compensation for the least 
paid worker. See, e.g., § 2b, Compensation for Executives in Financial Firms Law, SH 2552 (2016) 874 
(Isr.). Israeli law limits the tax deductibility of compensation for executives in financial firms that exceeds 
thirty-five times the compensation for the lowest paid worker in the firm. Id. 
 119 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 190 (2015) (“The 
upshot . . . is that catalogs offer the legal system the certainty and predictability of rules and the flexibility 
of standards.”). 
 120 See, e.g., G. Alan Marlatt & Katie Witkiewitz, Harm Reduction Approaches to Alcohol Use: 
Health Promotion, Prevention, and Treatment, 27 ADDICTIVE BEHAVS. 867, 880–81 (2002) (adopting 
the harm-reduction view for alcoholism treatment). 
 121 For a discussion of how people look for justifications, see Bersoff, supra note 24, at 36–38, and 
Shalvi et al., supra note 25, at 187–89. 
 122 See generally, e.g., Jacob George, Muhammad Hussain, Thenmalar Vadiveloo, Sheila Ireland, 
Pippa Hopkinson, Allan D. Struthers, Peter T. Donnan, Faisel Khan & Chim C. Lang, Cardiovascular 
Effects of Switching from Tobacco Cigarettes to Electronic Cigarettes, 74 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY 
3112 (2019) (pointing to the cardiovascular advantages of e-cigarettes). 
 123 It should be noted that at least in some of the studies on electronic cigarettes, relatively few 
nonsmokers use them. See, e.g., Martin Dockrell, Rory Morrison, Linda Bauld & Ann McNeill, E-
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when the law suggests policy solutions that only partially solve a problem, it 
might cause “good people,” who would not have otherwise engaged in self-
interested behavior, to reconsider behaving unethically. In the case of 
corporate actors, this means that partial solutions might give directors and 
officers who abstained from self-interested behavior an excuse to behave 
unethically. This caveat is relevant to a particular issue in the corporate 
context: partial independence. In the corporate context, the most relevant 
example of partial independence is independent directors. 
a. Independent directors 
One of the central issues regarding board structure is the role of 
independent directors. The purpose of independent directors is to enhance 
the monitoring of the board over management by appointing directors to the 
board that are not connected to the management and other executives in the 
company.124 For a director to be considered independent, the board must 
determine, among other things, that: (a) the director or her immediate family 
member is not a current partner or employee of the company’s auditors, and 
did not work in the last three years on the company’s audits in a firm that is 
the company’s internal or external auditor; 125  (b) the director or family 
member is not, or was not within the past three years, an executive of a firm 
in which the current company’s executive officers served on the 
compensation committee;126 and (c) the director or a family member is not 
an employee of a company that, within the last three years, received or paid 
to the current company more than $1 million or 2% of the company’s 
consolidated gross revenues, whichever is greater.127 
The institution of independent directors is on the rise in the United 
States. Independent directors constituted roughly 20% of the directors in the 
1950s but reached about 75% by the mid-2000s.128 Independent directors are 
 
Cigarettes: Prevalence and Attitudes in Great Britain, 15 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RSCH. 1737, 1744 
(2013) (“While we found evidence supporting the view that e-cigarette use may be a bridge to quitting, 
we found negligible evidence of e-cigarette use among those who had never smoked.”). 
 124 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1301–02 (2009) (noting the different purposes of independent directors in 
companies with a controlling shareholder and companies without a controlling shareholder). 
 125 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 89, at 93. 
 126 Id. 
 127  Id. Besides direct regulation of disqualifying relationships, increasing the presence of independent 
directors could be done indirectly, such as by increasing legal sanctions for a fiduciary breach, developing 
intraboard structures that require an independent lead director, or reducing CEO influence over 
nomination of directors. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 
1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1477 (2007). 
 128 Gordon, supra note 127, at 1471. 
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viewed as such an important tool for corporate governance that the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ stock market mandated that 
all listed companies have a majority of independent directors, though they 
exempt controlled companies. 129  In practice, the share of independent 
directors exceeds that mandate substantially.130 
The rise of independent directors is mostly viewed as a positive 
development in corporate law. 131  Independent directors are believed to 
enhance the board’s monitoring capacities, which in turn reduces managerial 
embezzlement and tunneling.132 Yet a highly influential study surprisingly 
found that independent boards do not contribute to firm value133 and even 
pointed to a possible negative correlation between the proportion of 
independent directors on the board and firm performance.134 The correlation 
was especially strong in firms with only one or two insiders on a typical 
board.135 Similar findings were replicated in other studies.136 
 
 129 NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 102, § 303A.01; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 89, at 
90–91. 
 130 Gordon, supra note 127, at 1476. 
 131 Id. at 1468. 
 132 See id. at 1528–40. 
 133 Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and 
Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 923 (1999) (“[W]e explore some possible explanations for why 
firms with majority-independent boards appear not to perform any better than firms without such boards, 
and why firms with supermajority-independent boards might even perform worse, on average, than other 
firms.”); see also Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence 
and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 235–36, 239 (2002) (examining the correlation 
between independence of boards and its impact years ahead in order to address the argument that the 
impact of independence of the firm is mainly long-term); Ozcan Isik & Ali Riza Ince, Board Size, Board 
Composition and Performance: An Investigation on Turkish Banks, 9 INT’L BUS. RSCH. 74, 81 (2016) 
(finding a negative but statistically insignificant correlation between the percentage of outside directors 
on the board and firm performance in the Turkish banking industry); Paul M. Guest, The Impact of Board 
Size on Firm Performance: Evidence from the UK, 15 EUR. J. FIN. 385, 401–02 (2009) (finding a negative 
correlation between the number of outside directors on the board in UK companies and profitability 
measures, Tobin’s Q, and stock returns); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of 
Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 ECON. 
POL’Y REV. 7, 20 (2003) (finding no relationship between board composition and corporate performance 
from a survey of literature). 
 134 Bhagat & Black, supra note 133, at 944–45. 
 135 Id. at 945. 
 136 See id. at 942–45. Studies that have contradicted this finding have been criticized for their 
methodological flaws. For studies that have contradicted this finding, see Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. 
MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1317–18 (1998), explaining that their “research demonstrates a substantial and 
statistically significant correlation between an active, independent board and superior corporate 
performance,” and Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of 
Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 101, 121 (1985). 
For scholarship criticizing the studies with the contradicting findings, see Gordon, supra note 127, at 
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A few theories have been advanced to explain the observed negative 
effect of independent directors on firm performance. One explanation points 
out that while independent directors can monitor management more 
effectively, this benefit is accompanied by a cost that can cancel it out: 
outsiders have lesser abilities, relative to corporate insiders, to perform the 
monitoring duty effectively, as they are less familiar with the business in 
which the firm is involved and with the firm’s capabilities. 137  Thus, 
increasing the share of independent directors on the board may decrease firm 
performance, even if it improves the motivation of the board to monitor.138 
The second explanation is that even if independent directors may seem 
to have a negative impact on the performance of some firms, they may still 
have a net-positive systemic effect on all firms. The efficient practices that a 
firm adopts because of its independent board—such as lower executive 
compensation—would spread to its competitors, even those without 
independent boards, in order not to lag behind in their performance.139 In 
addition to the indirect externalities independent directors generate for other 
firms, they are also endowed with a direct systematic role pertaining to 
shareholders in general. In the United States, independent directors are 
tasked with ensuring the reliability of financial disclosures. 140  Better 
disclosures primarily create firm-specific benefits that enable more effective 
 
1501 n.142, which points to the fact that the Baysinger & Butler study tested the statistical significance 
of only one measure of performance and was not replicated by any other study. Professor Jeffrey Gordon 
argued that the parameter focused on in the study—the board’s attitude—does not reflect the actual 
activity of the board, but only shows the grade that the California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
assigned to boards based on their compliance with certain guidelines. See id. 
 137  Even staunch supporters for the monitoring role of boards have conceded the cost of 
independence and have recommended some level of insider representation. See Eugene F. Fama & 
Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 313–15 (1983). Evidence 
of the disadvantages of an outsized presence of independent directors was found in the decrease of 
acquirers’ returns when independent directors comprised over 60% of the board. See John W. Byrd & 
Kent A. Hickman, Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers?, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 219 (1992). A 
parallel positive impact of insiders was found in the analysis of the relationship between the makeup of 
boards’ strategic development committees and firms’ performances: a greater presence of insiders on the 
committees increased firm performance. See April Klein, Firm Performance and Board Committee 
Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275, 277 (1998). 
 138  The tradeoff between monitoring and strategic input may change across firms due to the 
heterogeneity of firms; that is, in some firms, the monitoring effect may be more important than in others. 
The proper course depends on various factors, such as the effectiveness of external market monitoring 
and the firm’s need for strategic oversight. See Gordon, supra note 127, at 1506–07. 
 139 Id. at 1508. 
 140 As part of the post-Enron response, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act endowed the SEC with the authority 
to enhance the independence of its audit committee. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit 
Committees, 79 SEC Docket 2876, 2881 (Apr. 9, 2003); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b) (2007) 
(codifying Exchange Act Rule 10A-3(b)). 
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monitoring of management. Yet they also generate interfirm externalities, 
enabling shareholders of other companies to monitor managerial 
performance based on the enhanced data of their rivals. 141  Furthermore, 
disclosure enables rival firms to make better allocative decisions.142 Thus, 
even if it does not seem that independent directors generate better 
performance, they may improve the functioning of the market as a whole. 
Therefore, firm-specific data do not constitute adequate proof that 
independent directors are counterproductive. 
The behavioral ethics framework suggests a very different explanation 
for the negative effect of independent directors on firm performance. As 
discussed above, studies have demonstrated that subtle and nonmonetary 
conflicts of interest may be as problematic, and even more powerful, than 
strong conflicts of interest.143 The fact that a conflict of interest is subtle 
makes it “invisible” to the agent. Consequently, even “good people” who do 
not consciously seek to promote their personal interest will end up doing so 
in contexts where they can either ignore the conflict or brush it aside as 
unimportant.144 For example, people tend to favor their in-group, even when 
that group is based on an insignificant factor, such as support of the same 
sports team.145 “Taking sides for no reason” and favoring others who are 
similar are persistent phenomena,146 even when performing altruistic acts. 
An agent’s objectivity illusion may be intensified by external factors 
aside from the subtlety of the conflict of interest itself. The CEO of Arthur 
Andersen—Enron’s accounting firm that collapsed after a well-documented 
scandal 147—testified before the SEC a year before the scandal “that the 
professionalism and objectivity of professional auditors solved the issue of 
auditor independence.”148 The SEC seemed to be convinced by this line of 
reasoning and missed the opportunity to prevent the Enron scandal by 
declining to prevent auditing firms from consulting for the firms they audit. 
In this respect, a possible lesson from the Enron debacle is not only that 
 
 141 Gordon, supra note 127, at 1509. 
 142 See id. 
 143 See supra Section I.A.1. 
 144 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
 145 See Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-
Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCH. REV. 4, 11 (1995). 
 146 See Anthony G. Greenwald, Jacqueline E. Pickrell & Shelly D. Farnham, Implicit Partisanship: 
Taking Sides for No Reason, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 367, 367–368 (2002); Greenwald & 
Banaji, supra note 145, at 11. 
 147  Cathy Booth Thomas, Called to Account, TIME (June 18, 2002), http://content.time. 
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,263006,00.html [https://perma.cc/HKS8-NJR7]. 
 148 Chugh et al., supra note 11, at 82–83. 
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professionalism does not provide immunity against wrongdoing, but that it 
may even entice wrongdoing by encouraging the agent to believe that she is 
immune from the influence of a subtle conflict of interest. In other words, it 
may render the conflict of interest invisible, catching the agent off-guard.149 
So, in the corporate context, independent directors may suffer from 
what we coin the “curse of partial independence.” Their status as 
independent directors intensifies their self-perception as “objective” agents, 
making them more susceptible to subtle conflicts of interest. As many 
scholars have pointed out, independent directors have a weaker type of 
conflict of interest.150 According to behavioral ethics, this might cause those 
directors to be more, rather than less, biased, making it easier to ignore or 
justify self-interested decision-making.151 
Even though they have no formal ties to the management or major 
shareholders and do not receive direct benefits from them, in many cases 
some degree of informal ties may exist. This may make independent 
directors less objective relative to ordinary directors because of the lower 
salience of such subtle conflicts of interest.152  Furthermore, management 
effectively chooses independent directors, so even without any preexisting 
ties, management is to some degree the benefactor of the independent 
director. This subtle conflict of interest may lead independent directors to 
“return the favor” by showing leniency toward management. As studies 
demonstrate, individuals have a tendency to take sides and support a certain 
actor who is perceived as a member of their team even when they do not 
derive any direct benefit from the gains of the side they support.153 Scholars 
label this the “mere categorization effect.”154 Such an effect may reinforce an 
independent director’s tendency to support management, which she 
 
 149 The Enron case has been subject to numerous studies all attempting to show how Enron’s 
corporate governance structure failed to provide any of the needed alerts to the pervasive wrongdoing in 
the organization. See, e.g., Ronald R. Sims & Johannes Brinkmann, Enron Ethics (Or: Culture Matters 
More than Codes), 45 J. BUS. ETHICS 243, 252–54 (2003). 
 150  See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling 
Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1285–86 (2017); Gordon, supra note 127, at 1471; James D. Cox 
& Donald E. Schwartz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Context of Termination of Derivative Suits by 
Independent Committees, 61 N.C. L. REV. 541, 542–43 (1983); MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE 
OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 146 (1976). 
 151  Yuval Feldman & Eliran Halali, Regulating “Good” People in Subtle Conflicts of Interest 
Situations, 154 J. BUS. ETHICS 65, 76 (2019) (demonstrating that participants who had a conflict of 
interest were willing to promote their self-interest, but only to a certain degree—for the most part, they 
were not willing to write things which were obviously biased). 
 152 See sources cited supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 153 See sources cited supra notes 145–146. 
 154 Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 145, at 378. 
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perceives as a member of her team, even though she does not benefit in any 
way from their gain. Recall that subtle conflicts of interest like these may 
have an even stronger impact than stark conflicts of interest. A recent study 
reinforces the claim that “subtle” conflicts of interest may have a stronger 
impact on the individual than stark conflicts of interest. In a real-life 
experiment involving 17,000 individuals in forty cities, researchers found 
that there is a greater tendency to return wallets to owners as the amount of 
cash in the wallet increases. 155  This finding stands in contrast to the 
conventional economic view that, everything else equal, a stronger financial 
incentive should have a stronger impact on an individual. In some cases, the 
reverse may be true. 
This analysis does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the 
institution of independent directors should be abolished. On the contrary, 
independent directors have the potential to improve corporate governance if 
measures are taken to address the subtle conflicts of interest that undermine 
their performance. A few scholars have suggested how to reinforce the 
independence of independent directors. First, the main suggestion arises in 
the context of companies with controlling shareholders. In order to eliminate 
the partial dependence of directors on controlling shareholders, Lucian 
Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani have proposed that public shareholders solely 
nominate between the candidates on a given slate, and even suggest 
candidates for independent directorship.156 This nomination process has the 
potential to eliminate, or at least decrease, the partial dependence of directors 
on controlling shareholders. Even in noncontrolled companies, it is possible 
to require that shareholders suggest independent directors to curb their 
dependence on management.157 
Suggestions by minority shareholders, however, may raise various 
practical challenges. Empowering shareholders to propose candidates may 
generate a flood of candidates, which would prevent a meaningful selection 
process from taking place. Moreover, shareholders may propose candidates 
who lack the necessary qualifications or, worse, abuse the process 
strategically. 158  Yet, the fact that in most companies the institutional 
investors—who have the capabilities and expertise to evaluate candidates— 
 
 155 Cohn et al., supra note 19, at 70–71. 
 156 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 150, at 1297–98. 
 157 Id. at 1298, 1309–10. 
 158 Id. at 1299, 1314. 
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comprise a significant portion of shareholders will reduce or even eliminate 
these potential problems.159 
Second, we could enable existing independent directors to nominate the 
directors who will replace them. An independent director who knows that 
she is leaving the firm has a weaker incentive to please management because 
she is not seeking reelection. More importantly, the entering independent 
director would not be elected by the management, and thus would not have 
a “subtle interest” to please them. 
Third, in addition to reforms in the selection process of independent 
directors, alternative restrictions on the characteristics of independent 
directors can address the special connection between directors and 
management. One way to do so is by broadening the restrictions that apply 
to independent directors. For instance, a corporation could ban not only 
candidates with familial or business ties to management, but also candidates 
with prior personal relationships with management from serving as an 
independent director. This may seem like an extreme measure, but there are 
enough candidates for independent directorships besides those that 
management knows on a personal basis. Adopting this measure may, 
however, require proxy advisory firms to take on the additional 
responsibility of suggesting to management possible candidates for 
independent directorship with whom they have no prior acquaintance. 
Fourth, corporations can address the challenge of social ties between 
independent directors and managers in another way. Instead of repressing 
interactions between directors and management, corporations can encourage 
social ties and interactions between independent directors and minority 
shareholders. For instance, corporations could establish an annual meeting 
between independent directors and minority shareholders. This sort of social 
interaction, dubbed as the “Woodstock for Capitalists” in the case of 
Berkshire Hathaway,160 takes place every year with the intended purpose of 
reminding the executives of the company for whom they work. A social 
connection to minority shareholders can counterbalance the soft ties between 
independent shareholders and management. The behavioral ethics literature 
shows that the remoteness and unidentifiability of a victim increases the 
 
 159 See Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street: A 
Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 20–27 (2019) (pointing to the 
growing share of passive funds of institutional investors and their positive impact on capital markets and 
governance of firms by shareholders). 
 160 See James Leggate, Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting 2020: 5 Things to Know, FOX BUS. 
(May 1, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/money/berkshire-hathaway-annual-meeting-2020-5-
things-to-know [https://perma.cc/6PSW-VKWT]. 
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susceptibility of wrongdoing. Professor Amitai Amir found an increase in 
cheating when people deal with impersonal groups rather than individuals.161 
Currently, independent directors perceive dispersed shareholders as an 
unidentified remote group. Organizing interactions with minority 
shareholders would allow independent directors to look minority 
shareholders in the eye and increase the level of commitment of independent 
directors towards them. 
Behavioral ethics literature also refutes other suggested reform ideas in 
corporate literature, like the suggestion for “gray” directors that strike a 
delicate balance between inside and independent directors. Such directors 
have “structural sympathy” for management due to the managerial positions 
they held in other firms, but they are also not insiders of the firms in which 
they sit on the boards.162 This combination should theoretically enable “gray” 
directors to bridge the gap between independent directors and inside 
directors, which would improve the group dynamics on the board as well as 
the level of discussion.163 Yet the behavioral ethics literature exposes the 
pitfalls of this proposal. The fact that “gray” directors have sympathy and 
some sense of solidarity with management while retaining a quasi-objective 
status may weaken their ability to monitor management. In contrast with 
insiders, who are aware of their inherent tendency to side with management 
and can therefore consciously impose internal restraints on such support, 
“gray” directors lack such awareness and may end up weakening the 
monitoring of management. 
b. Proxy advisory firms 
The curse of partial independence is also likely to afflict analysts at 
proxy advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and 
Glass Lewis. These firms provide advice to institutional investors regarding 
upcoming shareholder votes while also advising the firms in which the 
voting takes place. Many scholars have pointed out this conflict of interest.164 
 
 161 Amitai Amir, Tehila Kogut & Yoella Bereby-Meyer, Careful Cheating: People Cheat Groups 
Rather than Individuals, 7 FRONTIERS PSYCH. 1, 6 (2016); see also Kai Chi Yam & Scott J. Reynolds, 
The Effects of Victim Anonymity on Unethical Behavior, 136 J. BUS. ETHICS 13, 20–21 (2016) 
(concluding after three experiments that people are more likely to engage in unethical decision-making 
when the victim of their actions is unknown). 
 162 See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the 
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 800 (2001). 
 163 See id. 
 164 See Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The Case 
for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384, 402 (2009); Sagiv Edelman, Proxy 
Advisory Firms: A Guide for Regulatory Reform, 62 EMORY L.J. 1369, 1384 (2013); Asaf Eckstein, Skin 
in the Game for Credit Rating Agencies and Proxy Advisors: Reality Meets Theory, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
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Proxy advisors do not only provide advice to shareholders, but also provide 
services to firms, such as governance ratings for which firms pay. This 
positions proxy advisory firms in a classic conflict-of-interest situation: 
recommending voting stances on issues pertaining to firm managers, who 
themselves purchase services from the shareholder advising firms.165 Thus, 
recommendations to vote with management raise suspicion that they have 
been affected by the advisory firms’ conflict of interest, while 
recommendations to support proposals of hedge fund activists are viewed as 
a substantive validation of the merits of the hedge fund’s proposal.166 
The analysis of proxy firms’ recommendations shifts when viewed 
through the perspective of partial independence. In addition to obvious 
conflicts of interest, there is also a softer conflict of interest tilting the voting 
recommendations of institutional investors toward the side of activists: the 
analysts’ interests in maintaining relationships with hedge funds to preserve 
future employment opportunities. The hedge fund industry is one of the 
highest earning in the financial sector.167 For example, in 2016, the top fifty 
hedge fund managers, by one metric, earned more than any major U.S. bank 
executive, including at Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.168 The twenty-
five top earning hedge fund managers made a staggering $11 billion.169 There 
is no doubt that working as a hedge fund analyst is much more lucrative than 
working as an advisor for a proxy advisory firm or a corporate governance 
analyst in an institutional investment firm. 170  Further, analysts for proxy 
 
221, 230–31 (2017). All three articles claim that there is a conflict of interest in the leading proxy advisory 
firm, Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS), which provides its services to both investors and 
companies. 
 165 See Belinfanti, supra note 164, at 399–400; Edelman, supra note 164, at 1383–84; Eckstein, supra 
note 164, at 230–31. 
 166 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch, Dancing with Activists, 137 J. 
FIN. ECON. 1, 3 (2020). 
 167 See Beecher Tuttle, Here’s How Much You Really Earn at Hedge Funds vs. Traditional Asset 
Managers, EFINANCIALCAREERS (Nov. 27, 2018), https://news.efinancialcareers.com/uk-en/3000008/ 
hedge-fund-pay-asset-management-pay [https://perma.cc/S7WZ-9RAV]. Hedge fund managers also earn 
significantly higher incomes in comparison to other asset managers—not only the superstars, but also on 
average. For example, the average annual compensation for a fixed income manager in general asset 
management is approximately $0.5 million, while the same function in hedge funds earn on average $1.06 
million. Hedge funds’ compensation dominates the compensation of various roles in other funds as well. 
Id. Regarding the difference in compensation between hedge fund and institutional investors in more 
junior jobs, see sources infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 168 Alexandra Stevenson, Hedge Fund Managers Don’t Always Beat the Market, but They Still Make 
Billions, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/business/dealbook/best-
paid-hedge-fund-managers.html [https://perma.cc/NW8A-78ZK]. 
 169 Id. 
 170 According to Glassdoor, research analysts at ISS earn $63,154 annually (based on fourteen 
salaries). ISS Salaries, GLASSDOOR, https://www.glassdoor.com/Salary/Institutional-Shareholder-
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advisory firms and institutional investment firms can certainly be candidates 
for a hedge fund analyst job; their Wall Street experience—surveying public 
firms and those firms’ proposals, including proposals from hedge funds—
can be valuable for hedge funds. 171  As such, when analysts are making 
decisions regarding proposals from hedge funds, they may lean toward the 
side of the hedge fund in order to increase the likelihood of upgrading their 
pay by being hired by a hedge fund.172 Prior research has emphasized the 
conflicts of interest of professionals working for public sector regulating 
agencies due to their prospects of landing lucrative jobs in the private sector 
firms that they regulate.173 Here, we extend the possible impact of these 
“revolving doors” into the private sector to firms that provide private sector 
quasi-regulation. The impact of such future prospects may even take place 
 
Services-Salaries-E14612.htm [https://perma.cc/7YGX-SEAF]. Additionally, Glassdoor reports that a 
Glass Lewis proxy research analyst makes only $59,325 (based on the data of eight salaries). Glass Lewis 
& Co. Salaries, GLASSDOOR, https://www.glassdoor.com/Salary/Glass-Lewis-and-Co-Salaries-
E264399.htm [https://perma.cc/45X5-5Y7L]. The salaries of analysts at institutional investment firms are 
higher than at proxy advisory services companies, but still much lower than hedge funds. An analyst at 
BlackRock earns an annual income of $82,275 (based on 436 salaries). BlackRock Salaries, GLASSDOOR, 
https://www.glassdoor.com/Salary/BlackRock-Salaries-E9331.htm [https://perma.cc/CR6Y-3FFR]. An 
investment analyst at Vanguard earns $83,643 annually (based on thirty-two salaries). Vanguard Salaries, 
GLASSDOOR, https://www.glassdoor.com/Salary/Vanguard-Salaries-E4084_P2.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
NA2E-TDPU]. In contrast, an analyst at the hedge fund AQR Capital Management (AQR) earns $136,722 
annually (based on thirteen salaries). AQR Capital Management Salaries, GLASSDOOR, https://www. 
glassdoor.com/Salary/AQR-Capital-Management-Salaries-E213435.htm [https://perma.cc/2Z4A-
6U7P]. At the hedge fund Bridgewater Associates, an analyst earns $89,057 annually (based on six 
salaries), and a financial analyst earns $105,345 annually (based on four salaries). Bridgewater Associates 
Salaries, GLASSDOOR, https://www.glassdoor.com/Salary/Bridgewater-Associates-Salaries-
E117647.htm [https://perma.cc/6PKL-YNDH]. These data demonstrate how even in entry-level roles, 
salaries in hedge funds are 20% to 30% higher than at institutional investors, and much higher when 
compared to salaries at proxy services companies. These differences only grow when going up the 
professional ladder. See Stevenson, supra note 168. 
 171 For example, Jeff Dunn, a principal of AQR, a well-known hedge fund, was hired when his main 
experience was a research manager at QIC, one of Australia’s largest institutional investors. Jeff Dunn, 
AQR, https://www.aqr.com/About-Us/OurFirm/Jeff-Dunn [https://perma.cc/PG4K-MM96]. William 
Cashel, principal of AQR, gained prior experience at Natixis Asset Management, a large asset 
management firm, and Wachovia. William Cashel, AQR, https://www.aqr.com/About-
Us/OurFirm/William-Cashel [https://perma.cc/U2H7-6T8P]. Aryella Frommer, who heads investors 
relations at Trian Partners, started her career in Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. as an analyst in their 
investment management division. Aryella Frommer, TRIAN PARTNERS, 
https://trianpartners.com/people/aryella-frommer [https://perma.cc/MTV2-CRD7]. 
 172 For more data on such movement and a quantification of the conflicts of interest of analysts due 
to the pay gap between an analyst in an asset management company and an analyst in a hedge fund, see 
sources cited supra notes 170–171 and accompanying text. 
 173 See Yeon-Koo Che, Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion, 26 RAND 
J. ECON. 378, 379 (1995). 
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subconsciously, with no deliberate decision of the agent to enhance her 
prospects in the future.174 
Given this inadvertent effect of partial independence on the functioning 
of proxy advisory firms and large institutional investors, two policy changes 
flow logically. The first is restricting the ability of individuals who have 
worked in proxy advisory firms or corporate governance departments of 
large institutional investors to switch jobs to hedge funds or activist hedge 
funds. Disrupting the career pipeline should have a chilling effect on the 
motivations of employees to recommend siding with activists.175 
Such limitations may be problematic due to their profound market 
effects. Thus, limiting the ability of employees of proxy advisors to seek 
future employment with institutional investors and hedge funds may be 
detrimental to the functioning of the economy. 176  This brings us to the 
second, and softer, implication. Instead of attempting to curtail this sort of 
conflict of interest, it can simply be taken into account. Shareholders, 
regulators, courts, and scholars already attribute special weight to the 
recommendation of a proxy advisory firm or institutional investor, especially 
when they side with an activist. Such decisions are viewed as professional, 
independent, and impartial, so they are given special weight by the courts. 
But because our analysis suggests that their independence is not absolute, 
and that their decision to side with an activist may be motivated by the desire 
to secure future employment, courts should reduce the weight they give to 
such a recommendation.177 
4. Corporate Transgressions for the Sake of the Others 
The behavioral ethics literature emphasizes that there is a much greater 
likelihood of wrongdoing when it is done for the sake of others.178 This 
finding stands in contrast to the conventional rational-choice paradigm, 
which predicts that a person’s willingness to engage in wrongdoing is a 
function of the extent to which the wrongdoing serves the interests of that 
person.179 According to the rational-choice paradigm, as an individual gains 
 
 174 Id. 
 175 One of President Obama’s first executive orders of was to implement a cooling-off solution for 
the revolving-door problem in the context of government and regulated industries. See, e.g., Exec. Order 
No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 26, 2009) (restricting appointees to executive agencies from working 
in industries which they have regulated for a period of two years). 
 176 Regarding the importance of mobility of workers to enable informational flow in complex sectors, 
see ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY 
AND ROUTE 128, at 29–57 (1996). 
 177 See supra Section I.A.3. 
 178 See supra Section I.B.2. 
 179 Id. 
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more from wrongdoing, there is a greater likelihood that she will engage in 
the wrongdoing. The behavioral ethics literature argues that another 
paradigm of human behavior might also be true: an increase in the benefit to 
others from the wrongdoing may increase the likelihood that an agent will 
engage in the wrongdoing compared to an increase to the agent’s own 
benefit.180 People may be more likely to behave unethically when they feel 
comfortable about their choice, and doing something benevolent for others 
can be a powerful justification, making an agent in corporate contexts 
especially prone to behave unethically.181 
In particular, people are motivated to engage in wrongdoing to benefit 
individuals who are less well-off financially, even at their own expense. In 
one experiment, individuals in charge of grading others tended to inflate the 
performance of “poor” solvers—those that had lost in a lottery just 
beforehand—even when it decreased their own payment. 182  Other 
experiments have concluded that people are more likely to cheat when the 
benefits are split with another person than when they capture the full 
benefit.183 Related to the notion of “doing it for others” is the concept of 
professionalism. In many ways, corporate agents operate in their 
professional capacity, which makes focusing on profit-maximization much 
easier than that of an individual working in his personal capacity.184 
This phenomenon has many implications for the field of corporate 
governance because all of the major actors are doing things for others: 
directors and managers act for the benefit of shareholders. In this Section, 
we discuss three topics in corporate governance that are fundamentally 
implicated by these findings: transgressions for the firm or against the firm, 
multiple purposes of the firm, and expectation for vicarious profit-
maximization. 
 a. Transgressions for the firm or against the firm 
As noted above, according to behavioral ethics, there is a greater 
tendency to promote one’s self-interest when it also benefits others. In the 
corporate context, this implies that a person has a greater propensity to 
 
 180 FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 197. 
 181 Id. at 197–98. 
 182 Gino & Pierce, supra note 63, at 1159. 
 183  See, e.g., Wiltermuth, supra note 64, at 166 (finding that “[p]eople over-reported their 
performance more often when the benefit of doing so was split between themselves and another person, 
even if they did not know the other beneficiary and had no interaction with her/him.”). 
 184 Maryam Kouchaki Nejad Eramsadati, Professionalism and Moral Behavior: Does a Professional 
Self-Conception Make One More Unethical? 51 (Aug. 2012) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah), 
https://collections.lib.utah.edu/ark:/87278/s67w6sz0 [https://perma.cc/ZJ2C-BGQ8]. 
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promote their interest when it is for the firm’s sake and generates value for 
shareholders at the expense of third parties. These actions include the 
adoption of harmful environmental policies, tax evasion, antitrust violations, 
and other illegal activity like bribes. In all of these cases, the firm benefits at 
the expense of society at large.185 
This presents major implications for corporate liability. There is an 
ongoing and heated debate in the corporate law scholarship over whether 
civil and criminal liability should be imposed on corporations because of the 
actions or omissions of its organs.186 In many cases, there is a “de facto 
 
 185 Blake E. Ashforth & Anand Vikas, The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations, 25 RSCH. 
ORG. BEHAV. 1, 42 (2003). 
 186  Regarding the debate on corporate liability, see generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate 
Liability Strategies and the Cost of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984). See Andrew F. Tuch, The 
Limits of Gatekeeper Liability, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 619, 621–22 (2017) (responding to 
“Collaborative Gatekeepers” by arguing in favor of the proposal but suggesting “that its success is likely 
to depend on the particular ways in which it interacts with these (conventional) gatekeeping regimes”); 
Sharon Oded, Coughing Up Executives or Rolling the Dice?: Individual Accountability for Corporate 
Corruption, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 49, 50–53 (2016) (“[T]his Article critically examines the 
desirability of the policy promulgated by the Yates Memo from a social welfare maximization point of 
view.”); Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without 
Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 
42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 630–31 (2007) (arguing “that enterprise liability can and should be pared 
back, but that the legitimacy of the underlying policy requires that we see to it that executives who are 
responsible for corporate fraud or misreporting at the very least forfeit most or all of the immense wealth 
obtained as a result of their control over the firm during the time of the wrongdoing”). Scholars have also 
discussed the imposition of criminal liability on corporations. See Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal 
Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 144, 
190–91 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds., 2012) (“[T]he state should employ a multi-tiered duty-based 
composite regime that uses a combination of criminal and civil liability to induce optimal ex ante and ex 
post policing.”); see also Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate 
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 412–16 (2007) (suggesting a new reform that will focus on the goals of 
criminal corporate liability and the prosecutor’s role in pursing corporate fraud); V.S. Khanna, Corporate 
Liability Standards: When Should Corporations Be Held Criminally Liable?, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 
1240–42 (2000) [hereinafter Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards] (“The primary thesis of this paper 
is that neither strict liability, mens rea, nor negligence are likely to be optimal liability standards across 
the vast majority of corporate wrongdoing and that a composite liability regime—one which mixes 
elements of each of the liability standards—is likely to be the most desirable standard in most instances.”); 
William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
1343, 1344–50 (1999) (arguing the shift towards insulating corporations from vicarious liability that 
occurred during the late twentieth century “risks the creation of moral hazards that, given equivocal 
evidence of compliance effectiveness, undermines the objectives and spirit of corporate criminal law”); 
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 
1477–79 (1996) [hereinafter Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability] (“This Article compares the costs 
and benefits of corporate criminal liability with the costs and benefits of other possible liability 
strategies . . . in an effort to determine the best strategy or mix of strategies for society.”). See generally 
WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS: THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY (2006) (proposing a rule of constructive corporate liability, instead of vicarious liability, to 
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unitary liability” regime in which only the corporation bears the cost of 
wrongdoing by its directors or management due to subsidized insurance 
policies and indemnification clauses.187 The main justifications for imposing 
sanctions on a corporation for its agents’ wrongdoing are economic: 
incentivizing corporations to engage in internal monitoring188 and allowing 
the “deeper pocket” to compensate third parties.189 Behavioral ethics analysis 
provides an additional justification for imposing penalties on corporations 
rather than individual agents. If a key element in an individual’s motivation 
to engage in wrongdoing is to benefit the corporation, sanctioning the 
corporation for her wrongdoing may be the most effective way to deter the 
individual from engaging in the wrongdoing. 
The behavioral ethics scholarship offers a similar argument to explain 
an even more extreme situation in which the agent engages in a wrongdoing 
out of a sense of obligation to benefit others. Managers commonly lie for the 
sake of saving others in the corporation because of their sense of obligation 
toward others in the “corporate family,” even though they do not derive any 
real personal benefit from lying.190 A particularly famous example is the case 
of Enron, in which Ken Lay, Enron’s CEO, was convicted of lying (honest 
services fraud) even though the bulk of the fraud was engineered by others 
while he was not at the company.191 Indeed, by lying, he exposed himself to 
 
prioritize allocation of blame between individuals and entities, thereby freeing enforcement agencies from 
the “gamesmanship” of “cooperation, disclosures, and audits”). 
 187 Kraakman, supra note 186, at 858–62; see also Tuch, supra note 186, at 619–622 (proposing new 
rules for gatekeeper liability to supplement traditional direct liability for corporations and their managers); 
Oded, supra note 186, at 52 (noting corporations investigated by the DOJ for fraud face loss of 
cooperation credit, and thus liability, if they do not “identify individuals involved in the misconduct, and 
provide the DOJ with all relevant facts”); Arlen, supra note 186, at 161 (“Thus, even when only 
individuals are liable, firms bear the expected cost of both effort and crime through their obligation to 
pay wages equal to their employees’ expected costs when they act optimally.”); Langevoort, supra note 
186, at 627–28 (“In reports about private securities litigation, settlements (and the rare judgments after 
trial) in fraud-on-the-market lawsuits are almost always paid directly by the company or out of its 
directors’ and officers’ (‘D&O’) insurance coverage . . . rather than by the officers or directors charged 
with the fraud.”); Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards, supra note 186, at 1243 (asserting that when 
the criteria for vicarious liability are met, “[s]uch broad liability attribution has resulted in corporations 
being held criminally liable for almost all crimes except those ‘manifestly requiring commission by 
natural persons, such as rape and murder’” (quoting Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 
186, at 1488)). 
 188 See Kraakman, supra note 186, at 867–68. 
 189 See id. at 892–93. 
 190 See generally ALEX C. MICHALOS, The Loyal Agent’s Argument, in HOW GOOD POLICIES AND 
BUSINESS ETHICS ENHANCE GOOD QUALITY OF LIFE 53 (2017). 
 191 See O.C. Ferrell & Linda Ferrell, The Responsibility and Accountability of CEOs: The Last 
Interview with Ken Lay, 100 J. BUS. ETHICS 209, 210–11 (2011). 
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substantial personal risk without much personal gain.192 Thus, while building 
an atmosphere of a corporate family and forming organizational loyalty is 
perceived as an important value for investors, under certain circumstances it 
may work to their detriment. Studies have found that corporate ethical codes 
that use more formal and less “familial” language—usage of the term 
“employee” and not “we”—are more effective in curbing unethical 
behavior.193 
We therefore suggest that firms limit the establishment of a “familial 
relationship,” for example by limiting informal vocabulary in charters and 
ethical codes. In addition, courts and regulators should closely scrutinize the 
testimony of company organs about other organs, even when there is no 
apparent personal interest in the issue. Courts and regulators should also 
make more use of external monitors when there is some suspicion of fraud, 
even when it seems that the managers are not involved.194 
 b. Multiple purposes of the firm 
There are two well-established views on the purpose of a corporation: 
(1) the shareholder primacy approach, which holds that the corporation 
should maximize shareholder welfare exclusively;195 and (2) the stakeholder 
approach, under which the corporation should promote the interests of other 
constituencies besides shareholders, like workers, lenders, customers, and 
society at large.196 The tendency to legitimize actions when they are done for 
the sake of others therefore implicates the firm’s purpose. 
One of the economic arguments against the stakeholder view is that it 
undermines the ability to monitor agents effectively. When the firm 
considers purposes besides maximization of profits, which lack clear 
parameters, it is more complicated to assess the performance of an agent, 
which provides her greater leeway to promote her own self-interest.197 The 
 
 192 See id. at 214. 
 193 Maryam Kouchaki, Francesca Gino & Yuval Feldman, The Ethical Perils of Personal, Communal 
Relations: A Language Perspective, 30 PSYCH. SCI. 1745, 1762–64 (2019). 
 194  See, e.g., Ferrell & Ferrell, supra note 191, at 216–18 (“An ethical culture can prevent 
complacency through codes of conduct, training, and identification of potential ethical issues, as well as 
the development of systems to monitor and enforce ethical standards.”). 
 195 Regarding the proponents of the shareholder-centered view of the corporation, the stakeholder 
view, and the view of the Delaware Supreme Court regarding this matter, see sources cited supra note 
111 and accompanying text. 
 196 See sources cited supra note 111 and accompanying text.  
 197 See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 
736, 740 (2005); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 421–22 (2002) 
(explaining that when decisions are based on criteria other than profits, review of those decisions will 
necessarily be made in “hindsight” and the actor has minimal ability to predict to what extent their 
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inclination to serve one’s own interest when others benefit therefore 
exacerbates the problem of having multiple purposes and multiple audiences 
because, in addition to weakening external monitoring, it weakens internal 
monitoring. As there are more audiences that an agent can serve, it is easier 
for the agent to justify any of her actions. For example, an economically 
conservative manager’s preference for job security may be at odds with that 
of diversified shareholders who are risk-neutral and care only about 
maximization of expected outcomes. The manager may justify the 
conservative strategy to herself by invoking bond-holders who are more risk-
averse and prefer a conservative strategy. On the flip side, a manager who 
prefers self-aggrandizement may opt to make significant charitable 
contributions that will generate positive media coverage. Such a manager 
may justify this to herself by invoking the interest of the company in 
benefitting society at large. The fact that others are likely to benefit from 
otherwise self-serving actions thus weakens her own internal attentiveness 
to the self-serving motivation that underlies her actions. 
An additional finding from the behavioral ethics literature also supports 
limiting the number of purposes that a company has. People tend to engage 
in greater misrepresentation of facts when there is greater ability to engage 
in elastic justification.198 The more purposes the firm has, and thus, the more 
space the agent has for elastic justification, the more likely it will be that a 
person misrepresents the facts. The behavioral ethics analysis—the tendency 
to promote one’s own interest both when others gain and when there is 
flexibility regarding the standards of how one should act—therefore provides 
an additional justification for accepting the shareholder-primacy view of 
corporate law. The shareholder-primacy view, unlike the stakeholder 
approach, limits the ability of corporations to serve the interests of other 
constituencies besides shareholders. 
c. Expectation for vicarious profit-maximization 
There is an important side effect to the fact that corporate agents are 
obligated to maximize profits. This obligation creates an expectation that 
agents should do anything to achieve this goal, including engaging in illicit 
behavior. The actual expectation of how people should behave is known as 
 
behavior is legal); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management 
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1191–92 (1981) (arguing that a stakeholder-
oriented approach would cause management to “sacrifice the interest of the shareholders,” which “would 
greatly prejudice shareholders by decreasing the incentive of management to act in their best interest”). 
 198 See Schweitzer & Hsee, supra note 66, at 198. 
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the “injunctive norm” in social psychology.199 Scholars have argued that 
injunctive norms have greater impact on actual behavior in comparison to 
“descriptive norms”—the expectation of how people do behave.200 
Studies have shown that people apply the injunctive norm to individuals 
differently than they apply it to corporations when the law or norm is unclear. 
They expect individuals to abstain from ethically unclear behavior, while 
they have no such expectation from corporations.201 For this reason, people 
will tend to sue individuals for all types of violations, but often only sue 
corporations when they violate a clear law.202  Similarly, people attribute 
different levels of unethicality to a failure to repay an investment based on 
whether an individual or a corporation is involved, judging the latter as less 
unethical than the former. The same was shown with intentional harms by 
individuals as compared to corporations: people tend to find individuals’ 
conduct more severe.203 The expectation that managers strive to maximize 
 
 199  See Robert B. Cialdini, Renee J. Bator & Rosanna E. Guadagno, Normative Influences in 
Organizations, in SHARED COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 195, 
199–203 (Leigh L. Thompson, John M. Levine, David M. Messick eds., 1999). For an examination of the 
ramifications of these two sets of norms in the legal context, see Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The 
Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 577, 598–601 (2006), examining the impact of 
legal intervention in the field of copyright law, in which a gap may exist between the injunctive norm and 
the descriptive norm in the example of file-sharing, and Amos Schurr & Ilana Ritov, Winning a 
Competition Predicts Dishonest Behavior, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 1754, 1757 (2016), 
claiming that individuals in competitive settings are more likely to behave dishonestly. 
 200 Terry L. Boles, Themes and Variations, in SHARED COGNITION IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 
199, at 327, 336 (“In empirical studies that compared descriptive and injunctive norms . . . injunctive 
norms were found to be the stronger of the two in influencing behavior.” (citations omitted)). 
 201  See, e.g., Uriel Haran, A Person–Organization Discontinuity in Contract Perception: Why 
Corporations Can Get Away with Breaking Contracts but Individuals Cannot, 59 MGMT. SCI. 2837, 2844 
(2013) (“According to the different ethical standard account, a person who honors a contract is merely 
meeting expectations. In contrast, an organization that does so is going above and beyond expectations, 
and as such, it should be judged at least as favorably as, if not more than, the person.”). This conclusion 
is in line with prior research in the field of experimental philosophy, which has demonstrated that people 
expect corporations to be less constrained by emotion and thus they judge transgressions by individuals 
more harshly than those by corporations. See Joshua Knobe & Jesse Prinz, Intuitions About 
Consciousness: Experimental Studies, 7 PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 67, 77 (2008) (“The 
problem is simply that they don’t think corporations are capable of genuinely feeling anything.”); see also 
Heather M. Gray, Kurt Gray & Daniel M. Wegner, Dimensions of Mind Perception, 315 SCIENCE 619, 
619 (2007) (showing a correlation between perceived agency and “[d]eserving punishment for 
wrongdoing”). 
 202 Haran, supra note 201, at 2837 (“[T]his paper suggests that the contract’s moral component is 
weighted more heavily for individuals than for organizations.”). 
 203 Uriel Haran, Doron Teichman & Yuval Feldman, Formal and Social Enforcement in Response to 
Individual Versus Corporate Transgressions, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 786, 804–05 (2016) (finding 
corporations are judged less harshly than an individual if the transgression is intentional, but that the 
reverse is true in the context of negligence); see also V. Lee Hamilton & Joseph Sanders, The Second 
Face of Evil: Wrongdoing in and by the Corporation, 3 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 222, 229–30 
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profits at the expense of their commitment to third parties serves as a self-
fulfilling prophecy. 
There are two possible responses to the injunctive-norm problem. The 
first is simply to raise the sanction a corporation receives for wrongdoing. If 
corporations take advantage of the uneven application of the injunctive 
norm, then according to the classical deterrence framework, we can offset 
the increase in likelihood of illicit behavior by increasing the sanction. There 
are two problems with this response, however. Increasing external sanctions 
may backfire. Increasing the “price” of a behavior may decrease the 
manager’s sense that there is any wrongdoing.204 The increase in “price” may 
activate agents’ “calculative” mode, causing them to see the decision of 
whether to engage in misconduct as a business decision, not an ethical one.205 
The problem of deactivating an agent’s ethical frame of mind is especially 
pressing in the context of injunctive norms, in which the central problem is 
that the expectation of misconduct by corporate agents diminishes the ethical 
wrongness of the action. Thus, further diminishing the ethical mindset by 
increasing sanctions may, in some cases, exacerbate the problem. Another 
problem with increasing the sanction is an ethical one. Injunctive norms 
make an agent less aware of the wrongness of her action—to her it seems 
that she is doing what she should be doing. So, on retributive grounds, it is 
problematic to increase the sanction when the agent is not fully cognizant of 
the unethicality of an action. 
The second response is informal sanctions like shaming. The SEC or 
DOJ could publish the names of managers or boards who have adopted an 
especially aggressive approach to profit-maximization irrespective of the 
cost to third parties.206 These informal sanctions have been proven to be 
especially successful in dealing with the problem of injunctive norms, as 
 
(1999) (“It is precisely [when we consider an actor’s behavior negligent] that respondents appear to hold 
corporate actors to higher levels of foresight and responsibility.”). 
 204 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations 
of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1797–98 (2001). 
 205  See Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames, and 
Cooperation, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 684, 697–98, 701–04 (1999) (describing how sanctions can evoke a 
calculative business frame of mind and drive down social cooperation). This is similar to the “price” 
effect discovered later but tailored for the business context. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is 
a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (2000) (finding parents were more likely to pick up their children late 
from daycare when a fine was imposed than when there was no fine). 
 206 Regarding a shaming mechanism of individual managers, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in 
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1832–35 (2001). The say-on-pay mechanism adopted in the 
Dodd–Frank Act could also be viewed as utilizing a shaming mechanism: the board could approve a 
compensation package that a majority of the shareholders objected to, but it would be stigmatized as a 
board that does not fully serve shareholders. See supra Section I.A.2. 
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illustrated by the publication of wrongdoers’ names in order to curb the norm 
of peer-to-peer file-sharing.207 Informal sanctions, such as reputational ones, 
directly address the weakness of injunctive norms by increasing the ethical 
salience of the wrongdoing. 
B. Procedural Applications 
In this Section, we discuss the procedural implications of behavioral 
ethics. The term “procedural” refers to how decisions are made or should be 
made in a corporate setting as opposed to the content of the decisions. Of 
course, there is a tie between the two: improved decision-making processes 
that take account of bounded ethicality should, on average, lead to better 
outcomes for the corporation. We discuss specific examples related to 
omission bias and the balancing between deliberation and speed. 
1. Omission Bias 
The phenomenon of omission bias—people’s tendency to judge 
harmful actions as worse than equally harmful omissions—is well 
documented in the behavioral economics literature.208 It can lead individuals 
to act against their own welfare—preferring to cause harm through passive 
means rather than causing the same harm through active means. 209 
Scholarship offers several explanations for omission bias, such as status quo 
bias and loss aversion. 210  One particular explanation may be especially 
relevant here: the greater moral attribution and responsibility associated with 
 
 207 Feldman & Nadler, supra note 199, at 609. 
 208 See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 18, at 160 (“The regret associated with a loss that 
was incurred by an action tends to be more intense than the regret associated with inaction or a missed 
opportunity.”); Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambiguity, 
3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263, 263 (1990) (“[T]he tendency to favor omissions (such as letting 
someone die) over otherwise equivalent commissions (such as killing someone actively).”). The omission 
bias’s effect on corporate actors might be exacerbated because once someone has done nothing at an early 
stage of a process, he is more likely to do nothing again in later stages. See, e.g., Orit E. Tykocinski & 
Thane S. Pittman, The Consequences of Doing Nothing: Inaction Inertia as Avoidance of Anticipated 
Counterfactual Regret, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 607, 607 (1998) (finding that “[h]aving passed 
up one opportunity to gain, the person becomes more likely to pass up another opportunity to gain,” 
assuming the second opportunity is of lesser yet still positive value to the person). Regarding the omission 
bias’s application to the legal context, see generally Adi Libson, Missing Inaction: Internalizing 
Beneficial Omissions, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 427 (2014) (arguing for legal mechanisms to credit 
beneficial omissions). 
 209 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 18, at 173; see also Ritov & Baron, supra note 208, at 263 
(finding subjects reluctant to vaccinate if the possibility of bad outcomes exists, despite worse expected 
outcomes if no vaccine is given). 
 210 EYAL ZAMIR, LAW, PSYCHOLOGY AND MORALITY: THE ROLE OF LOSS AVERSION 17–20 (2015). 
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a commission relative to an omission. 211  The lower degree of moral 
attribution and responsibility in cases of omissions may imply that 
individuals will be especially prone to pursue their self-interest through 
passive behavior. This lower degree of moral attribution likely enables 
people to maintain their moral self-perception while promoting their own 
interest.212 
The behavioral ethics explanation of omission bias has many 
ramifications for the field of corporate governance. It predicts that 
individuals positioned to have a conflict of interest, such as managers and 
directors, will be more prone to promote their self-interest through omissions 
than through commissions, even if the latter will permit them to promote 
their self-interest more effectively. Consequently, corporate governance 
should be molded to provide greater scrutiny of passive decisions of directors 
and managers. A recent study showed that where participants learned that 
there might be some justification to lie in a game due to technical problems 
in the game’s framework, participants were far more likely to withhold 
information than to positively provide false information.213 Another study 
found a statistically lower level of attendance among directors with possible 
conflicts of interest at board meetings—evidence that supports the existence 
of an ethical omission bias.214 This surprising finding could be explained by 
 
 211 See David B. Sugarman, Active Versus Passive Euthanasia: An Attributional Analysis, 16 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 60, 72–73 (1986) (finding individuals perceived doctors who assisted patients with 
euthanasia as more responsible for a patient’s death, and morally condemned them more harshly, than if 
the doctor had tried to heal the patient); see also Mark Spranca, Elisa Minsk & Jonathan Baron, Omission 
and Commission in Judgment and Choice, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 76, 103 (1991) (suggesting 
“omission bias in the moral sphere allows people to feel righteous by abstaining from sins of 
commission”); Johanna H. Kordes-de Vaal, Intention and the Omission Bias: Omissions Perceived as 
Nondecisions, 93 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 161, 169 (1996) (suggesting individuals view acts of 
commission as intent whereas acts of omission are viewed more as nondecisions); Ritov & Baron, supra 
note 208, at 275 (noting that many subjects did not write arguments for why they chose not to vaccinate 
at the optimal level, but those who did argued mainly about responsibility). 
 212 See also Nina Mazar & Scott A. Hawkins, Choice Architecture in Conflicts of Interest: Defaults 
as Physical and Psychological Barriers to (Dis)honesty, 59 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 113, 113–
117 (2015) (documenting greater likelihood of dishonesty in the context of omission than in the context 
of commission and hypothesizing that people would be more prone to approve a false financial statement 
that benefits them if it required an act of omission than if they had to actively assert false financial 
information). 
 213 See Andrea Pittarello, Enrico Rubaltelli & Daphna Motro, Legitimate Lies: The Relationship 
Between Omission, Commission, and Cheating, 46 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 481, 483–84 (2016). 
 214  Adi Libson, Conflict of Interests Between Banks and the Stock Exchange: Manifestations, 
Implications and Policy Recommendations, 47 HEBREW U. L. REV. 491, 512–16 (2018) (demonstrating 
how the conflicts of interest of directors on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange—those representing banks—
may be manifested by omission, like a lower level of attendance, which weakens the ability to execute 
reforms that would harm the banks, rather than commission of actively passed decisions that would 
benefit the banks). 
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the omission bias: directors are not willing to actively promote their self-
interest but are willing to passively promote their self-interest by not 
attending board meetings.215 Even if they could promote their interests more 
effectively by their active participation in the decision-making process, they 
opt to promote it via passive behavior. For instance, if they have an interest 
in a competing company to theirs, they may not promote policies that provide 
an advantage to the rival company, but if the company has to change in order 
to maintain its market position, they might choose not to bring this up until 
somebody else does. Even though the active promotion of their own interests 
might subjectively seem worse to a director, in both cases their behavior 
promoted their interests at the expense of others.216 
The omission bias has implications for corporate governance and 
provides a better justification for some prevailing practices. For example, 
directors effectively nominated by management may never authorize a self-
dealing transaction, but may demonstrate weak oversight of management 
through omission.217 And shareholders of a company that have a conflict of 
interest due to their holdings in rival companies are unlikely to pressure the 
company to act in a way that harms the company to the benefit of its 
competitors, but may influence the company not to take certain competitive 
actions at the expense of the rival companies. This bolsters one of the 
arguments against institutional investors: that their holdings of shares in rival 
companies causes their firm’s management to abstain from executing certain 
competitive strategies.218 In the following Section, we describe the ways in 
which the omission bias can be addressed in various contexts: transforming 
passivity to activity, the business judgement rule, and a duty to vote on 
financial institutions. 
 
 215 Id. at 510. 
 216 Id. 
 217 See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967, 971–72 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(finding the board had exercised appropriate oversight and established appropriate information and 
reporting systems regarding pervasive illegal practices of employees—providing doctors with kickbacks 
for prescribing the company’s drugs—even though “the Board was to some extent unaware of the 
activities that led to liability”). Though the court found no evidence of bad faith, id. at 972, allowing such 
practices to take place may benefit managers by increasing the sales of the company. Even though the 
board may be willing to promote the managers’ interest via passive behavior of not executing any 
oversight, it may have never been willing to promote the management’s interests actively, like by 
approving a conflicted transaction. 
 218 See Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1273–74 (2016); see also 
José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 
1513, 1558–59 (2018) (presenting evidence from the airline industry that horizontal shareholding by 
institutional investors has chilled competition). 
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a. Transforming passivity to activity 
i. Board absence 
The most effective way to address the omission bias is by transforming 
passive behavior patterns into active ones. For instance, in the above 
example, conflicted directors are more prone to promote their self-interest in 
passive ways, like by not attending board meetings.219 Studies have shown 
that signing requirements, which alert agents to potential unethical behavior 
beforehand, curb unethical behavior.220 So, requiring absent directors to sign 
a form stating that they understand that their absence may have a negative 
impact on the firm may curb their indirect promotion of self-interest. In other 
words, transforming absence into an active form of behavior increases the 
salience of the self-interest that may be driving it. In this case, it may increase 
the directors’ aversion to being absent and the indirect promotion of self-
interest that results. 
ii. Management of earnings 
We can also reframe passive behavior into active behavior in the 
prevention of earnings management. Firms have a higher tendency to 
manage earnings to meet or exceed analyst forecasts when ethical 
considerations are less salient, as measured by the concurrent incidence of 
political scandals.221 If ethical salience affects the management of earnings, 
salience could be enhanced through the method suggested above: requiring 





 219 See supra notes 217–218 and accompanying text. 
 220 See, e.g., Keri L. Kettle & Gerald Häubl, The Signature Effect: Signing Influences Consumption-
Related Behavior by Priming Self-Identity, 38 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 474, 474–75 (2011) (demonstrating 
that signing can increase one’s identification with her in-group); Lisa L. Shu, Nina Mazar, Francesca 
Gino, Dan Ariely & Max H. Bazerman, Signing at the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases 
Dishonest Self-Reports in Comparison to Signing at the End, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 15197, 
15197–98 (2012) (conducting studies replicating tax filing and filing forms for insurance companies and 
finding that cheating decreased when participants were asked to sign at the beginning of the form rather 
than the end). 
 221 See David C. Cicero & Mi Shen, Do Executives Behave Better when Dishonesty Is More Salient? 
28 (June 17, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=2748258 
[https://perma.cc/V2CH-979Q] (finding a negative correlation between the level of exposure to political 
scandals in the media and inflation of firm’s earnings through various manipulations, though the effect 
was only temporary and disappeared during the second year following a scandal). 
 222 In order to increase the effectiveness of such an affirmation, it could be done after providing an 
example in which earnings were managed. 
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iii. Reference point for proxy advisory firms 
Numerous scholars have underscored the conflict of interest that proxy 
advisory firms face. 223  While these firms are supposed to advise 
shareholders, much of their income comes from advising management and 
other services paid directly by firms, such as corporate governance ratings.224 
The omission bias may exacerbate the problem because when proxy advisory 
firms agree with the board’s recommendations, they are relatively passive. 
Their “active” mode is activated only when they oppose a management 
recommendation, which requires affirmative effort. Accordingly, proxy 
advisory firms are much more prone to promote their own interest by siding 
with management. 
But an intervention can address this conflict of interest. Instead of 
treating the company’s management or directors as the reference point, 
proxy advisory firms can use the activist’s recommendation for how to vote 
on a certain issue as the reference point. The default view, or the one that 
would be accepted in the absence of any objection, would not be the 
managerial view but the activist view. Here, the more passive behavior of 
accepting the recommendation used as the reference point works against the 
direction that the advisors’ own interests lean. 225  Under this framework, 
passivity will not exacerbate the conflict-of-interest problem. 
b. Redefining the business judgment rule 
The ethical omission bias also underscores a profound problem with the 
business judgment rule.226 The business judgment rule effectively immunizes 
business decisions from judicial review if they are informed, adopted in good 
faith, and without a conflict of interest. The business judgment rule also 
applies to decisions not to decide.227  Accordingly, if new information is 
 
 223 See sources cited supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 224 See sources cited supra notes 165–166 and accompanying text. 
 225 Such a method of overcoming the omission bias in situations where a decision does not require 
active justification is fairly close to the accountability method for debiasing ethical biases mentioned in 
the behavioral ethics literature. Under the accountability method, the individual is informed prior to 
making a decision that he will have to justify his decision after the fact. This may influence him to 
deliberate more carefully before making his actual decision and reduce the probability that he will 
succumb to System 1 pitfalls. See Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of 
Accountability, 125 PSYCH. BULL. 255, 257, 270–71 (1999); Katherine L. Milkman, Dolly Chugh & Max 
H. Bazerman, How Can Decision Making Be Improved?, 4 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 379, 381–82 (2009); 
FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 89–92. 
 226 This is in addition to the general inefficacy of ex post liability mechanisms—from which the 
imposition of fiduciary duties also suffers—that tend to be vague and, as such, less effective in curbing 
“wrongs” by good people. See supra Section I.B.3. 
 227 See Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Director’s Good Faith, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 457, 499–503 (2007) 
(pointing to courts’ rulings that have interpreted the good-faith condition of the business judgment rule 
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brought to the attention of the board or company’s management and they 
erroneously decide not to respond to it, they are sheltered from liability. As 
noted, the behavioral ethics literature demonstrates that there is a difference 
between decisions to stay the course and decisions to change it: when harm 
is caused by omission, it is viewed less severely than an identical harm 
caused by commission. This finding suggests that corporate executives 
approach decisions to preserve the status quo differently than they treat 
decisions to depart from it. Yet, the same level of scrutiny—the very lenient 
business judgment rule—is applied to both types of decisions. 
A legal regime that takes into account omission bias 228  should 
differentiate between corporate decisions that change the status quo ante and 
decisions that preserve it. To be sure, the business judgment rule should 
apply to decisions of the former type, as it does now. But decisions falling in 
the latter category should be reviewed under the more demanding enhanced 
scrutiny standard. The enhanced scrutiny standard, also known as “the 
enhanced business judgment rule,” shifts the burden of proof to the corporate 
executives, requiring them to show that their decision was adequately 
informed, taken in good faith, and without a conflict of interest.229 Applying 
the enhanced scrutiny regime to decisions not to act should sensitize 
corporate executives to the decision they are facing, prompting them to think 
about the justifications they have for the decision not to act and their ability 
to convince a court of law that the decision was preceded by a serious 
deliberation process. 
c. Justifying the imposition of a duty to vote on financial 
institutions 
The omission bias may also help shed light on current legal practices in 
the realm of corporate governance. An example is the mandate imposed on 
institutional investors to vote the proxies of the shares they hold. The 
Department of Labor first required proxy voting for institutional investors 
managing defined-benefit retirement plans in 1988. 230  In 2003, the SEC 
 
broadly, excluding only cases of explicit mala fides (bad faith) and thus effectively protecting almost all 
cases of omission, for which proving mala fides is much harder). 
 228 See supra Section I.A.1. 
 229 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985). Unocal is the typical case 
for the enhanced scrutiny standard: the creation of a poison pill by the board in case of a hostile takeover. 
The poison pill is prone to serve the special interest of the board and management of keeping their 
positions in the firm, but may also serve the interests of the shareholders by maximizing their share value 
in the future by avoiding the current hostile takeover. 
 230 Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin., U.S. 
Dep’t of Lab., to Helmuth Fandl, Chair of the Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc. *2 (Feb. 23, 1988), 1988 WL 
897696. The Department of Labor serves as the regulator of defined-benefit retirement accounts under 
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imposed a similar mandate on other institutional investors, including mutual 
funds and defined contributions plans.231 One of the reasons typically given 
for mandating institutional investors to vote is their lack of incentive to do 
so. Typically, institutional investors prefer to focus on portfolio building 
rather than on actively participating in the management of the companies in 
which they invest, including exercising their voting rights in such 
companies.232  This is unsurprising because their revenues from portfolio 
building—attracting funds and earning profits based on their portfolio 
performance—are much higher than from portfolio management, developing 
the profitability of businesses in their portfolio.233 
The efficacy of mandating voting is, however, not immediately 
apparent. If it is not worth it for institutional investors to invest in voting, 
they are unlikely to meaningfully invest in informing their vote.234 While it 
is possible to regulate actions, it is not possible to regulate effort. 
Nonetheless, the omission bias justifies the imposition of this mandate. 
Even though institutional investors do not prioritize the management of their 
investments due to their self-interest, this omission is in conflict with the 
interest of their investors, to whom they are obligated. The decision of 
institutional investors to promote their own interest at the expense of their 
investors may be context-sensitive. Because of their obligation toward their 
investors, they will not actively harm their investors’ interests, but they may 
tend to violate their interests through passively deprioritizing investment 
management. But once they are required to vote, and the true unethicality of 
voting irresponsibly is shown, institutional investors would account for their 
beneficiaries’ interests. 
 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). For the codification of this voting mandate, see 
29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (Oct. 17, 2008), superseding 59 Fed. Reg. 32,607 (June 23, 1994). 
 231 Final Rule: Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Release No. IA-2106, 17 C.F.R. § 275 (Jan. 
31, 2003) [hereinafter Investment Advisers Act Release], http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2106.htm 
[https://perma.cc/T5NA-94UB]. 
 232 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 889–95 (2013) 
(explaining that the main reason institutional investors’ interest in intervening with governance issues is 
weak is because they are mainly interested in relative performance to their peers, and that any increase in 
a company’s value that is generated by their intervention also benefits peers who have a position in their 
company, while they themselves bear all the costs). 
 233 Id. at 895. Regarding the conflict of interest between managers in financial institutions and their 
beneficial investors, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of 
Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 89, 90 (2017), which differentiates between the incentives of 
managers of index funds and actively managed funds. 
 234 See Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an Age 
of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1424–25 (2014). 
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2. Balancing Deliberation and Speed 
In Part I, we discussed the role of System 1 in explaining unethical 
behavior and showed that decisions made with limited cognitive resources 
are likely to be less ethical.235 This issue came up in one of the most famous 
cases in corporate law, Smith v. Van Gorkom,236 a key element of which was 
what Delaware courts have later labeled “process due care.”237 Behavioral 
ethics may provide an additional justification for the court’s questionable 
ruling. 
In Van Gorkom, Trans Union Company faced an offer—the “Pritzker 
Proposal”—to purchase the company at a considerable premium over its 
market price: $55 per share when the market price was $38. The offer had a 
very narrow time frame, though—the board had only three days to consider 
it. 238  The board considered the offer two days later, based on oral 
presentations of the CFO and Van Gorkom, the chairman and CEO, without 
a detailed valuation opinion or other documents.239 The board approved the 
deal on the condition that it could solicit and accept higher offers in a market-
test period.240 
The majority of the court concluded that the “[b]oard was grossly 
negligent in that it failed to act with informed reasonable deliberation in 
agreeing to the Pritzker merger proposal.”241 It pointed to procedural flaws, 
such as the lack of any proper valuation assessment242 and the haste in which 
the meeting to discuss the offer had been called, which eliminated the 
possibility of processing the subject matter in advance.243 The majority ruled 
that the directors breached their fiduciary duty “by their failure to inform 
themselves of all information reasonably available to them and relevant to 
their decision.”244 
 
 235 See Shalvi et al., supra note 45, at 1269; see also Ruedy & Schweitzer, supra note 43, at 82. 
 236 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 237 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“Due care in the decisionmaking context is 
process due care only.”); see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 89, at 129 (“Numerous Delaware decisions 
confirm that judicial references to a requirement of due care really go to the adequacy of the 
decisionmaking process—what the court has begun calling ‘process due care.’”). 
 238 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867, 875. 
 239 Id. at 864–65, 868. 
 240 Id. at 869. 
 241 Id. at 881. 
 242 Id. at 877–78. 
 243 Id. at 875. 
 244 Id. at 893. 
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Judges John McNeilly and Andrew Christie dissented. 245  Judge 
McNeilly criticized the majority’s analysis of the transaction as a “fast 
shuffle” in which the directors were duped, and labeled this characterization 
“the beginning of the majority’s comedy of errors.”246 Judge McNeilly noted 
that such transactions are typical to “the corporate world of then and now 
[that] operates on what is so aptly referred to as ‘the fast track.’”247 As some 
scholars have noted, flexibility in decision-making enables decision-making 
“at the speed of business,” thus allowing firms to capitalize on opportunities 
that otherwise would have been lost.248  
The majority’s finding that time constraints adversely affect the quality 
of board decisions has been reaffirmed elsewhere. In McMullin v. Beran, the 
Delaware Supreme Court opined that “[h]istory has demonstrated boards 
‘that have failed to exercise due care are frequently boards that have been 
rushed.’”249 
The behavioral ethics literature sheds new light on whether corporate 
law should require an inflexible level of deliberation for certain decisions or 
allow companies to move “at the speed of business” to avoid missing out on 
business opportunities. It highlights an additional dimension: lengthy 
deliberations tend to prevent unconscious promotion of self-interest. 
Deliberations executed through more controlled processes tend to be more 
ethical than intuitive processes, which tend to promote the individual’s self-
interest.250 When people are under a time constraint or fatigued, they tend to 
 
 245 Id. (McNeilly, J., dissenting); id. at 898 (Christie, J., dissenting). 
 246 Id. at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting). 
 247 Id. at 895. 
 248 Jonathan R. Macey, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Insights About C.E.O.s, Corporate Law Rules, and 
the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 620 (2002). Some 
scholars have gone even further in their criticism of the decision and cynically renamed the majority’s 
decision in Van Gorkom the “investment bankers’ full employment doctrine.” Lynn A. Stout, In Praise 
of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment 
Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 676 n.5 (2002). Scholars critique the majority’s decision. See Fred S. 
McChesney, A Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush: Why Van Gorkom Still Rankles, Probably, 
96 NW. U. L. REV. 631, 631 (2002) (“Considered a legal disaster in 1985, [Van Gorkom] is judged no less 
disastrous today.” (footnote omitted)); Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans 
Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1441 (1985) (arguing that it is not possible to specify performance 
obligations for informed decisions). For another critique of the majority’s decision, see Robert W. 
Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standards for Outside Directors, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 5, 28–29 
(1989). 
 249 McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 922 (Del. 2000) (quoting Citron v. Fairchild Camera & 
Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 67 (Del. 1989)). 
 250 See, e.g., Kees van den Bos, Susanne L. Peters, D. Ramona Bobocel & Jan Fekke Ybema, On 
Preferences and Doing the Right Thing: Satisfaction with Advantageous Inequity when Cognitive 
Processing Is Limited, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 273, 286 (2006) (finding that when appraising 
a situation, people have an almost automatic preference for outcomes that benefit themselves and only 
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behave more dishonestly,251 a relationship that has been reaffirmed in meta-
analyses.252 
These findings may support lengthy deliberations processes, but only 
when there is concern that the individual will make a decision that promotes 
her own self-interest at the expense of the company’s interest, such as in a 
self-dealing transaction. This is not the case in Van Gorkom and similar 
cases. The central question was whether the board was negligent and violated 
its duty of care without any reference to a conflict of interest, which typifies 
violations of duty of loyalty. Yet, as some scholars have noted, a soft conflict 
of interest was lurking in the background of Van Gorkom and may have been 
motivating the whole transaction. Van Gorkom’s rush to sell the company 
may be explained by the fact that he was very close to the mandatory 
retirement age and thus wanted to liquidate his significant holdings in the 
company before retiring.253 Such “soft” self-interests may be relevant to a 
large array of cases. In these cases, like in Van Gorkom, it may not be 
sufficient to treat the case as a violation of the duty of loyalty, but it is 
 
later—i.e., a few seconds—correct their views to take into account fairness toward others); Yoella 
Bereby-Meyer & Shaul Shalvi, Deliberate Honesty, 6 CURRENT OP. PSYCH. 195, 196 (2015) (finding that 
people’s intuitive reasoning makes them more likely to cheat and that being given time to deliberate 
reduced cheating). 
 251 See, e.g., Shalvi et al., supra note 45, at 1267 (finding participants who had to respond quicker 
were more unethical than those with more time); Gino et al., supra note 43, at 192 (describing self-
regulation, or self-control, as a finite resource which depletes as an individual continuously exerts it); 
Bereby-Meyer & Shalvi, supra note 250, at 195–96 (asserting that with respect to the energy individuals 
require for self-control, “[d]epletion leads to dishonesty”); Maryam Kouchaki & Isaac H. Smith, The 
Morning Morality Effect: The Influence of Time of Day on Unethical Behavior, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 95, 100–
01 (2014) (“[W]e found evidence across four experiments that, provided with the opportunity, people are 
more likely to engage in unethical acts in the afternoon than in the morning.”). Regarding how this effect 
is curtailed in settings that lead agents to more deliberation, such as when they are primed with the concept 
of time rather than the concept of money, see Francesca Gino & Cassie Mogilner, Time, Money, and 
Morality, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 414, 419–20 (2014), and in settings when performing the task in a foreign 
language, see Yoella Bereby-Meyer, Sayuri Hayakawa, Shaul Shalvi, Joanna D. Corey, Albert Costa & 
Boaz Keysar, Honesty Speaks a Second Language, 12 TOPICS COGNITIVE SCI. 632, 638–40 (2020). 
 252 Kristina Suchotzki, Bruno Verschuere, Bram Van Bockstaele, Gershon Ben-Shakhar & Geert 
Crombez, Lying Takes Time: A Meta-Analysis on Reaction Time Measures of Deception, 143 PSYCH. 
BULL. 428, 444 (2017) (distinguishing between the mental resources required for making a decision, 
where truth-telling requires more resources, and the cognitive resources required for executing an action, 
where executing an action based on a lie requires greater cognitive resources); Köbis et al., supra note 
46, at 792–93 (“Our results suggest that ‘thinking fast’ amplifies the force of self-interest leading to 
ethical rule violations, as long as those violations do not directly harm others.”). 
 253 See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 89, at 130 n.75 (stating that “[o]ne could perhaps construct a 
self-dealing argument by focusing on the fact that Van Gorkom was very close to the mandatory 
retirement age and owned 75,000 shares of Trans Union Stock . . . [which] meant that he had an incentive 
to sell the company,” but concluding “his self-interest was directly in-line with the interests of the 
shareholders, who presumably also would want the best possible price”). 
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worthwhile to consider the potential influence of the conflict of interest on 
the agent’s decision. 
Further, mandating lengthy deliberations processes for merger and 
acquisition agreements that include an external valuation as well as an 
opportunity for the board to read the full agreement and other documents 
may eliminate decisions that are self-serving for management and other key 
members in the corporation.254 This additional advantage may outweigh the 
costs of inflexible lengthy deliberations in the form of foregone business 
opportunities. 
CONCLUSION 
The introduction of misconduct by “good people” with benevolent 
motivations into corporate law gives rise to a more complete and accurate 
account of the corporate world. It reveals that the motivations of corporate 
executives and employees are far more nuanced and varied than traditional 
analysis suggests, as are their failures. Behavioral ethics’ potential impact on 
the law is immense—as scholars have already demonstrated, it can shift the 
focus of legal policy and transform the ways in which law regulates 
behavior.255 Corporate law, on account of its reliance on agency relationships 
and group decision-making, is a natural target for the application of 
behavioral ethics. The behavioral ethics literature teaches that corporate law 
should not be exclusively concerned with stark conflicts of interest but 
should also pay much closer attention to subtle conflicts of interest that are 
much more common in the day-to-day operations of corporations. 
Under the conventional framework, the central objective of corporate 
governance is assumed to be the deterrence of “bad people”—calculative 
self-interest-maximizers—from promoting their own goals at the expense of 
the shareholders. So legal interventions are largely based on a Beckerian 
 
 254 This notion of increasing awareness and reflection through organizational procedures is discussed 
to some extent in management literature. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Butterfield, Linda Klebe Treviño & Gary 
R. Weaver, Moral Awareness in Business Organizations: Influences of Issue-Related and Social Context 
Factors, 53 HUM. RELS. 981, 1008 (2000) (finding “that management can increase moral awareness in 
the workplace,” and that their employees could be influenced “by the magnitude of consequences of 
issues, by working in a highly competitive context, by framing using moral language, and by perceived 
social consensus that an issue is ethically problematic”); Ann E. Tenbrunsel & Kristin Smith-Crowe, 
Ethical Decision-Making: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going, 2 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 545, 
546–48 (2008) (“The purpose of this paper is to review the literature on ethical decision making in 
organizations, specifically focusing on behavioral, or descriptive, ethics . . . .”). For a discussion of the 
technological ways to slow executives’ decision-making in order to decrease unethical decision-making, 
see Todd Haugh, The Ethics of Intracorporate Behavioral Ethics, 8 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 1–3, 10 
(2017). 
 255 FELDMAN, supra note 17, at 1–31. 
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model, in which enhanced sanctions raise the expected cost of wrongdoing.256 
But the behavioral ethics literature suggests other forms of intervention that 
are not concerned with the magnitude of the sanction, including increasing 
the salience of the wrongdoing and addressing and altering the circumstances 
that enable subtle unethicality to be ignored. Building on these insights, we 
propose a series of reforms in corporate law that span a broad range of topics 
from the role of independent directors, to decision-making processes, to 
judicial review standards. 
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